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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Debate is raging within many school districts around the country
about public school teachers’ interactions with their students outside of
school through social media sites, such as Facebook and MySpace.1
* Mark Schroeder, Assistant Professor of Legal Skills, Quinnipiac University School of
Law; J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A., Williams College. I received
helpful comments on this article during a faculty colloquium at Quinnipiac University
School of Law. Thanks to Dean Brad Saxton for his research support and to Susan
Dailey, William Dunlap, Neal Feigenson, Elizabeth Marsh, and Joseph Olivenbaum for
their comments. I am deeply indebted to Martin Margulies for his comments, insights,
and encouragement. Thanks also to Peggy for making this possible. Any errors, of
course, are my own.
1

See Jennifer Preston, Rules to Stop Pupil and Teacher From Getting Too Social Online,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/business/media/rulesto-limit-how-teachers-and-students-interact-online.html; see also Karen Matthews,
Should teachers “friend” students?, USA TODAY (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-04-19/facebook-teachers-social-students/
54416058/1 (“At least 40 school districts nationwide have approved social media
policies.”). Nothing in this Article should be interpreted as requiring teachers to engage
in off-campus communications with students using social media. Under current law, if
schools require this type of speech, schools can regulate it. Rather, this Article assumes
that some teachers may choose to communicate with students in this context.

1

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIX, Issue 2

While most of the controversy involves only the major social media sites,
the overall debate is not so limited and includes teachers’ communications
with students through other electronic means, such as Tweeting or even
texting.2 Attempts to regulate the use of social media and other forms of
electronic communication between teachers and students have occurred
both on the state level,3 and more frequently, on the local school district
level.4 In fact, local school boards in California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Virginia have all updated, or are currently revising, their social media
policies, focusing on limiting teacher-student contact through social
media.5 The New York City Department of Education recently unveiled a
new policy, which bans interactions between teachers and students on

2

See, e.g., M.L. Schultze, Schools, lawmakers develop social media bans, WKSU NEWS
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.wksu.org/news/story/29290 (noting that the Dayton Public
School District instituted a ban that includes Tweeting, instant messaging, and texting).
Most of these prohibitions or restrictions do not yet specifically include blogging. See id.
But see, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA
GUIDELINES 1 (2012), available at http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/BCF47CED604B-4FDD-B752-DC2D81504478/0/DOESocialMediaGuidelines20120430.pdf
(including restrictions on blogging).
3

See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 162.069.1 (2012).

4

See Preston, supra note 1. Local school boards in Connecticut have also joined the fray.
See David Moran, Interim Superintendent Says Controversial Social Media Policy
Copied From Other Towns, MANCHESTER PATCH (May 31, 2012),
http://manchester.patch.com/articles/interim-superintendent-says-controversial-socialmedia-policy-copied-from-other-towns.
5

See Preston, supra note 1. While attempts to restrict teachers’ use of social media are a
relatively recent occurrence, attempts to restrict teachers’ off-campus conduct are not
new. See Jonathan Zimmerman, When Teachers Talk Out of School, N.Y. TIMES (June 3,
2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/opinion/04zimmerman.html. In 1927, a
schoolteacher in New Jersey lost her teaching license for smoking cigarettes after school
hours. Id. Additional grounds for teacher dismissal included card playing, dancing, and
even failure to attend church. Id. After Prohibition ended, teachers could still be
dismissed for drinking or frequenting a place where liquor was served. Id.
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non-school sanctioned social media sites.6
[2]
Districts imposing these bans and lesser restrictions generally
justify them based on two major concerns: first, the worry that teachers
will reveal inappropriate information about themselves to students; and,
second, the fear that teachers will use social media to develop
inappropriate relationships with their students.7
Typically, these
limitations on speech do not distinguish between speech originating on
school grounds and “off-campus speech.”8
[3]
Of course, other educational stakeholders, including teachers,
administrators, and parents, oppose any restrictions on teacher-student
interactions beyond a teacher’s existing professional obligations, such as
student confidentiality.9 While acknowledging the concerns underlying
the movement to restrict teacher-to-student social media speech, these
advocates oppose any ban or restrictions on teacher communication with
students via social media, arguing that a teacher’s use of social media can
create a more effective, inclusive learning environment and develop

6

See NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4.
Over thirty years ago, the Second Circuit warned of the danger of school officials
“ventur[ing] out of the school yard and into the general community.” Thomas v. Bd. of
Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979). That danger has arrived.
7

See Rules to Limit How Teachers and Students Interact Online, TEACHER WORLD (Dec.
20, 2011), http://www.teacher-world.com/teacher-blog/?p=2248.
8

See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §162.069.1. For purposes of this Article, “on campus” speech
includes any speech made on school premises or using school technology, or any speech
made at a school-sanctioned event, even if the event occurs off-campus. “Off-campus”
speech refers to any other teacher speech. This Article prefers “off-campus” speech to
“off-duty” speech because the best teachers are seldom “off-duty.”
9

See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (protecting student records); CONN. AGENCIES
REGS. § 10-145d-400a(b)(1)(J) (1998). This Article supports extensive protection of
teachers’ First Amendment rights, but given special student confidentiality and safety
issues, it does not support full First Amendment rights for teachers.
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stronger teacher-student relationships.10 Furthermore, social media have
become, to a large extent, “Main Street.”11 Because a school district could
not ban or restrict a conversation between a teacher and student that occurs
outside of campus on Main Street, the district should not be able to ban or
restrict the electronic equivalent of a Main Street interaction.
[4]
The law governing teacher-student interactions through social
media and other electronic communication is still evolving. At present, no
state has regulated this type of communication, although Missouri has
come close.12 The most widely publicized statewide attempt to regulate
teacher-student interactions through social media, Missouri’s Amy Hestir
Student Protection Act,13 failed when a Missouri court enjoined it shortly
10

These proponents note that teachers, especially newly-trained teachers, use social
media. See Emily H. Fulmer, Privacy Expectations and Expectations for Teachers in the
Internet Age, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14, ¶ 6 (2010) (citing Teresa S. Foulger et al.,
Moral Spaces in MySpace: Preservice Teachers’ Perspectives about Ethical Issues in
Social Networking, 42 J. RES. ON TECH. & EDUC. 1, 7 (2009)). Furthermore, given the
pivotal role this technology has played in recent history in social movements around the
world, banning its use within an educational context seems myopic and antiquated.
11

See State of the Media: The Social Media Report Q3 2011, NIELSEN,
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/social/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (noting that “nearly
4 in 5 active Internet users visit social networks” and “[a]cross a snapshot of 10 major
global markets, social networks and blogs reach over three-quarters of active Internet
users,” suggesting that social media is the “Main Street” of the Internet).
12

See Amy Hestir Student Protection Act, 2011 MO. LEGIS. SERV. S.B. 54 (West)
(providing that “[n]o teacher shall establish, maintain, or use a nonwork-related internet
site which allows exclusive access with a current or former student”); Amended Order
Entering Preliminary Injunction, Missouri State Teachers Ass’n v. Missouri, No. 11ACCC0053, 2011 WL 4425537 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011).
13

See Missouri: Amy Hestir Davis Student Protection Act - Student Abused by a Jr. High
School Teacher, SEXLAWS.ORG,
http://www.sexlaws.org/Amy_Hestir_Davis_student_protection_act (last visited Nov. 17,
2012) (describing that Amy Hestir, while a seventh grade student, was repeatedly
molested by one of her junior high school teachers); cf. Brett Borders, A Brief History Of
Social Media, COPY BRIGHTER MARKETING (June 2, 2009),
http://copybrighter.com/history-of-social-media (demonstrating that social media sites

4
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before it was to go into effect.14 In response, the Missouri legislature
revised the statute, thereby eliminating the regulation of teachers’ use of
social media. Instead, the Missouri legislature settled for encouraging
school districts to promulgate a written policy concerning school
employee-student communication using social media.15 At the moment,
there exists sparse case law examining this issue.
[5]
This Article aims to provide a consistent approach for protecting
off-campus teacher-to-student speech using social media, which protects
most teacher-student speech so long as the speech does not unduly disrupt
the workplace or the school learning environment.
[6]
Given the dearth of authority, the trends regarding First
Amendment16 protection provided to teachers, particularly with respect to
off-campus speech, are difficult to discern. To date, the United States
Supreme Court has not examined the issues concerning off-campus
teacher-to-student communication. Furthermore, a few lower courts have
issued rulings in this area, but these decisions are not particularly
illuminating. For instance, the speech in the most frequently cited teacherlike Facebook or MySpace did not exist at the time Amy was molested). See generally
infra Part II(A)(1) (discussing the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act in further detail).
14

Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 12.

15

See Mo. REV. STAT. § 162.069.1 (2012).

16

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment’s speech protections
apply to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The government can regulate speech in
two capacities: as a sovereign or as an employer. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671
(1994) (plurality opinion). The government’s authority to regulate speech as a sovereign
is far more limited than its authority to regulate speech as an employer. Id. (stating that
the government has “far broader powers” to regulate speech than it does “as [a]
sovereign” in its role as an employer). This Article contends that the government is also
limited in regulating speech occurring on the outer fringes of the employment
relationship.

5

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIX, Issue 2

to-student social media case involved egregious conduct on the teacher’s
part, thus providing little guidance as to how courts would treat teacher
conduct not rising to that level.17
[7]
This Article focuses on a public school teacher’s off-campus use of
social media to communicate with students.18 This type of communication
does not fit neatly into the developing free speech jurisprudence. Under
current law, to receive First Amendment protection, a teacher must
establish that she did not speak pursuant to her official job duties19 and
that her speech implicated a matter of public concern.20 If so, the burden
of production shifts to the school to establish that the government’s
interests in providing efficient services, including a safe learning
environment, outweigh the citizen-teacher’s interests in commenting on
these matters and the public’s interests in hearing the speech.21
[8]
This Article explains how the Court’s current free speech
jurisprudence governs this type of speech, concluding that any wholesale
ban on teacher-to-student speech in this context is likely overbroad, and
therefore violates the First Amendment. In addition, these categorical
bans might also be unconstitutional "as-applied" to particular speech.
17

See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 298 (D. Conn. 2008) (stating that the
teacher’s MySpace page included “pictures of naked men with . . . ‘inappropriate
comments’” below the pictures).
18

As previously stated, “on-campus” speech includes any speech made on school
premises or using school technology, or any speech made at a school-sanctioned event,
even if the event occurs off-campus. “Off-campus” speech refers to any other teacher
speech.
19

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).

20

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).

21

See Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2011); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of
Educ., 624 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2010); Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070-72 (9th
Cir. 2009).
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[9]
Finally, the Article suggests a simpler test for evaluating teacherstudent speech using social media, which seeks to balance a teacher’s
interest in speech with a school’s interest in promoting an efficient
workplace and providing an effective learning environment. This test
would offer protection to any teacher speech in this context if, first, the
teacher communication is not made pursuant to the teacher’s official
duties or, second, the message’s recipient could not reasonably conclude
that the expression was made in the teacher’s official capacity. However,
this protection is not absolute. If school officials can then establish that
the school’s interests in prohibiting the speech outweigh the teacher’s free
speech interests, the teacher’s speech can still be restricted. In a departure
from current law, this test would not require that the speech implicate a
matter of public concern to receive First Amendment protection.22
[10] Under this proposed test, to restrict a teacher’s off-campus speech
to a student using social media, a school administrator would need to
demonstrate that the school’s interests in maintaining an effective learning
environment or efficient working environment outweigh the teacher’s free
speech interests. The political nature of the speech is a crucial component
in weighing these concerns. The more political the speech, the greater the
level of disruption that school administrators would need to demonstrate in
order to restrict the speech. Nevertheless, even speech with no political
import would require some on-campus disruption, whether actual or
foreseeable, to limit this type of teacher-student communication.
[11] This proposed framework attempts to honor the competing policies
underlying free speech jurisprudence by balancing a public teacher’s offcampus rights to free speech with a school district’s interests in providing
an age-appropriate learning environment and efficient working
22

The public concern requirement should be eliminated for all public employees. The
focus of this Article, however, is on teachers using social media to communicate with
students in an off-campus setting. Given the interactive, rapidly evolving nature of social
media speech and the indirect benefits this speech might generate, a public concern
limitation is particularly unnecessary.

7
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environment.23 The framework recognizes that while the government, as
an employer, can at times limit employees’ speech based on workplace
efficiency concerns, the government’s ability to restrict employees’ speech
is more limited when the government seeks to restrict speech at the outer
edges of the employment relationship and is far more limited when the
government restricts speech as a sovereign.24 In the case of most offcampus teacher-to-student communications using social media, school
districts are regulating teacher speech at the outer fringes of the
employment relationship because teachers are under no obligation to
engage in this speech.25 The proposed framework for regulating teacherto-student communication using social media also recognizes the special
relationships existing within schools and therefore does not provide full
First Amendment protection to teacher off-campus speech with students.
Instead, it provides extensive protection for teacher off-campus speech
since the framework requires some disruption to the working or learning
environment before a teacher’s speech can be regulated.
[12] In addition, this framework seeks to engender some parity between
the treatment of off-campus teacher speech using social media and offcampus student speech using social media.26 While teachers and students
23

The Supreme Court has justified First Amendment free speech protection on two
grounds: the rights of the speaker to engage in the speech and the rights of the audience
to hear the speech. The Court has never endorsed one theory to the exclusion of the
other. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos
Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 641 (2012).
24

See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he
government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as
sovereign.”).
25

This Article posits that, in most circumstances, school districts will be regulating
teachers’ off-campus, social-media speech to students almost in a “sovereign” role
because the districts are regulating speech that lies on the fringes of the employment
relationship. Courts should be more hostile to government speech regulation when the
regulation does not directly involve an employee’s core job responsibilities.
26

See generally Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596-600 (6th Cir. 2007) (deciding a
student-athlete free speech claim by analogizing to public employee cases).

8
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are not similarly situated with respect to their First Amendment rights and
therefore the protection of their speech need not be identical, the disparity
in courts’ protection of teacher and student speech is apparent. The trend
with respect to student off-campus speech using social media is that this
speech receives virtually full First Amendment protection.27 By contrast,
the few existing decisions with respect to teacher off-campus speech using
social media have ruled in favor of the school district. While public
school teachers’ and students’ free speech rights to use social media need
not be identical, there should be more parity in their treatment.
[13] This
proposal
focuses
on
regulating
teacher-student
communication using social media, given the special concerns applicable
to the relationship between public school teachers and students.28 This
Article does not contend that this test is appropriate in all public-employee
contexts.

27

See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir.
2011) (holding that a student’s criticism of his principal is protected speech even though
it contained false allegations of sexual misconduct between the principal and students at
the school because the speech did not disrupt the school environment). Notably, the
speech at issue was not “political” speech. Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring).
28

This Article will not address any potential teacher First Amendment freedom of
association claims, nor will it address any potential academic freedom exception to the
Pickering-Connick test. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1995)
(implying, in dicta, that there may be an academic freedom exception to PickeringConnick). Whether academic freedom is itself constitutionally required or is merely an
academic tradition embraced by the free speech clause is debatable. See RONNA GREFF
SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION § 2:2 (2011). Post Garcetti, lower courts have been hostile to free speech
arguments grounded on academic freedom concerns when non-university level faculty
make these arguments. See, e.g., Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 334 (6th
Cir. 2010) (holding that a teacher’s curricular speech was made pursuant to her official
duties).
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGULATION OF TEACHERS’
OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
A. Statewide Regulation
1. Missouri: The Amy Hestir Student Protection Act
[14] The most widely publicized attempt to prohibit off-campus
teacher-student speech is Missouri’s Amy Hestir Student Protection Act
(“AHSPA”).29 In July 2011, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon signed the
AHSPA into law.30 According to the AHSPA’s sponsor, Missouri Senator
Jane Cunningham, the law’s purpose was to limit private communications
between teachers and students on social networking sites in order to
prevent sexual abuse of students by their teachers.31 Cunningham noted
that in certain cases of teachers’ sexual exploitation of students, some of
the communications between teachers and students occurred on social
networking sites.32
[15] The AHSPA required every school district to promulgate a policy
concerning teacher-student communication.33 The less controversial part
of AHSPA mandated that each school district’s policy must include, at a
minimum, that “no teacher shall establish, maintain, or use a work-related
29

See Kayla Webley, Missouri Law: Teachers and Students Can’t Be Facebook Friends,
TIME (Aug. 1, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/08/01/in-missouri-teachers-andstudents-legally-cant-be-facebook-friends/.
30

See Tanya Roscorla, The Reason Why Missouri Passed the Amy Hestir Student
Protection Act, CTR. FOR DIGITAL EDUC. (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://www.centerdigitaled.com/policy/Missouri-Electronic-Communications-PartOne.html.
31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Amy Hestir Student Protection Act, 2011 MO. LEGIS. SERV. S.B. 54 (West).
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internet site unless such site is available to school administrators and the
child’s legal custodian, physical custodian, or legal guardian.”34 However,
the statute went beyond regulating work-related Internet sites to include
social networking sites. In short, the AHSPA required that each school
district’s policy prohibit teachers from “establish[ing], maintain[ing], or
us[ing] a nonwork-related site which allows exclusive access with a
former or current student.”35 Under the AHSPA, “exclusive access”
means “the information is available only to the owner (teacher) and user
(student) by mutual explicit consent and where third parties have no
access to the information on the website absent an explicit consent
agreement with the owner (teacher).”36 A “nonwork-related internet site”
means “any internet website or web page used by a teacher primarily for
personal purposes and not for educational purposes.”37 In essence, the
statute aimed to prevent any private communication between teachers and
students attending the teachers’ schools through sites like Facebook and
MySpace, at least until the student reaches the age of nineteen or
graduates.38
[16] The Missouri State Teachers Association (“MSTA”) sought to
enjoin the AHSPA, claiming that it violated the free speech clauses of
both the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution.39 A
few days before the AHSPA was scheduled to take effect, a Missouri
Circuit Court granted a preliminary injunction to the MSTA prohibiting its
enforcement.40 The court concluded that social networking is “extensively
34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

See id.

39

Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 12.

40

Id.

11
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used by educators.”41 In particular, the court found the “breadth of the
prohibition [to be] staggering.”42 Consequently, the court held that the
AHSPA would have a significant “chilling effect” on free speech.43
Because this “chilling effect” resulted in the deprivation of free speech
rights, the court held that the resulting injury was irreparable.44 Finally,
the court concluded that the MSTA had demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of its free speech claims and that the
public interest was best served by delaying the implementation of the
AHSPA until a trial occurred.45
[17] Shortly following the enjoining of the AHSPA, the Missouri
legislature passed a revised law requiring each school district to
promulgate
a
written
policy
concerning
employee-student
communication.46 These policies must cover the use of electronic media
to prevent improper communications between staff members and
students.47 In October 2011, Governor Nixon signed the bill into law
before the preliminary injunction expired, effectively repealing the portion
of the AHSPA related to teachers’ use of social media.48 The new law
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 12; see also Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time . . . constitutes irreparable injury.”).
45

Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 12.

46

See MO. REV. STAT. § 162.069(1) (2012).

47

See id.

48

See David A. Lieb, Missouri Repeals Law Restricting Teacher-Student Internet and
Facebook Interaction, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2011, 6:06 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/21/missouri-repeals-law-rest_n_1025761.html.

12

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIX, Issue 2

does not provide any guidance as to the appropriate limits on teachers’ use
of social media sites for Missouri’s 523 public school districts.49 The
critics of the new law contend that it is unlikely that individual school
districts will properly balance the rights involved given that the state itself
could not do so.50
2. Virginia
[18] Although Missouri was the first state to codify a prohibition
against exclusive teacher and student speech using social media,
Virginia’s Board of Education considered a teacher-student social media
ban in November 2010.51 The primary purpose of this ban was to deter
sexual conduct between school employees and students.52 The proposed
guidelines would have limited teachers’ electronic communication with
students to accounts, systems, and platforms provided by the school.53
Similar to Missouri’s original law, Virginia’s proposed guidelines would
have prohibited any "texting" between teachers and students as well as any
teacher-student interaction through social networking sites.54 Ultimately,
the Virginia Board of Education passed guidelines merely calling for
transparency in communication between employees and students,
accessibility to parents and administrators, and professionalism in content
and tone.55
49

See MO. REV. STAT. § 162.069(1).

50

See Lieb, supra note 48.

51

VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT & ABUSE IN VIRGINIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5-12 (Jan. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/boe/meetings/2011/01_jan/agenda_items/item_j.pdf.
52

See id.

53

Id. at 8.

54

Id.

55

VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND
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3. Louisiana
[19] In 2009, Louisiana enacted a law that requires school employees
who contact students by phone, email, or other electronic means to use
only school-provided devices and to discuss only "educational services"
in these communications.56 If a teacher violates this provision, he or she
must report the violation in a manner that the school board sanctions.57
These restrictions have not yet faced any constitutional challenge.
B. Local School Districts
[20] As recently reported, local school boards in California,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia have updated or are
in the process of revising their social media policies, focusing on limiting
teacher-student contact using social media.58 As previously stated, the
New York City Department of Education recently unveiled its new policy
banning interaction between teachers and students on social media web
pages, at least when these sites are not school-sponsored.59
[21] The policy adopted by Dayton, Ohio, is illustrative. In Dayton, the
Board of Education’s new social networking policy bars teachers from
"friending" their students on Facebook.60 It also prohibits educators from
ABUSE IN VIRGINIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 3 (Mar. 24, 2011), available at
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/boe/guidance/safety/prevent_sexual_misconductabuse.pdf.
56

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:81(Q)(2)(b) (2012).

57

Id. at § 17.81(Q)(2)(c).

58

See Preston, supra note 1; see also Moran, supra note 4.

59

NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4.

60

See Margo Rutledge Kissell, Local teachers banned from ‘friending’ students on
Facebook, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Aug. 30, 2011, 11:22 PM),
http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/local-teachers-banned-from-
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texting or sending instant messages to their students.61
[22] While courts have not yet been required to decide many of these
disputes, this situation will undoubtedly change shortly.62
III. TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL
MEDIA: A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
CATEGORICALLY BANNING THIS SPEECH
[23] To date, there have been no academic studies regarding primary
and secondary school teachers’ use of social media with students beyond
the classroom setting. This Article posits that without empirical support
for restricting teacher speech in this context, school districts should be
apprehensive about censuring this speech even if the censorship does not
violate the First Amendment.63
[24] The policy arguments surrounding the regulation of teacher-tostudent communication through social media are complex. On a general
level, categorical bans of this type of speech are driven by a fear of newer
technologies; few of the bans include older technologies such as the
telephone, or perhaps even the most dangerous type of off-campus

friending-students-on-f/nMtkR/; see also DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DAYTON PUBLIC
SCHOOLS POLICY MANUAL 295 (Apr. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.dps.k12.oh.us/documents/contentdocuments/document_23_5_2038.pdf (“To
maintain a more formal staff-student relationship, district employees shall not ‘friend’
current students on social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace (except when
that employee is a relative or legal guardian of the student).”).
61

Kissell, supra note 60.

62

See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979) (warning of the
danger of school officials “ventur[ing] out of the school yard and into the general
community”).
63

See infra Part XIII (concluding that categorical bans are likely unconstitutional).
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interactions between teachers and students, those occurring “in-person.”64
But concern about new technologies is rarely used to justify these bans or
restrictions.
[25] In the debates surrounding the passage of these bans or restrictions,
the benefits of this speech are infrequently discussed. Consequently, these
benefits are likely underestimated. More typically, bans or restrictions on
this type of speech are justified on two concerns: the concern that teachers
may disclose inappropriate information and the concern that teachers may
potentially use these mediums to engage in predatory conduct.65 These
concerns are certainly legitimate, but likely overstate the dangers of this
speech.
[26] There are tangible benefits to allowing this type of teacher offcampus speech. Teachers are trained to interact with minors and can serve
as role models for appropriate social media discourse. In addition,
teachers may discover bullying or other dangerous behavior by
participating in social media with students. Even if teachers are off-duty,
they could intervene in constructive ways.66
64

See supra Part II (discussing the social media website and text messaging focus in the
teacher-student communication bans in Missouri, Virginia, and New York).
65

Two incidents sparked the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act. One incident included
reports of teachers being disciplined for compromising photos found online. Another
incident involved a teacher exchanging more than 700 text messages with a student while
the teacher engaged in a sexual relationship with the student. See Roscorla, supra note
30.
66

For example, as an adult trained to deal with school-aged children, a teacher may be
well-positioned to encourage a suicidal student to seek help. Allowing social media
interaction between teachers and students may also benefit students’ emotional and social
development in other, more general, ways. In one recent study, the authors concluded
that social media helps teens develop empathy. See B. A. Birch, Study: Social Media
Helps With Teenage Empathy, Awareness, EDUC. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.educationnews.org/technology/study-social-media-helps-with-teenageempathy-awareness/.
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[27] Furthermore, allowing this type of off-campus teacher speech with
students may have important residual educational benefits to the school’s
learning environment as well.
One potential benefit of these
communications is that they may help develop a better learning
environment at school by making students more comfortable with their
teachers.67 Current primary and secondary school students, as well as
many of the newer teaching graduates, are immersed in this electronic
environment. As a recent study indicates, the number one technology that
students use outside of school is social networking.68 Prohibiting offcampus communication between teachers and students in this context—
widening the gap between in-school and out-of-school life for the
student—potentially inhibits the development of better relationships
between teachers and students.69
[28] In addition, the use of social media may allow teachers to better
target particular learning styles in the classroom.70 For example, students
who are uncomfortable speaking during class may be less hesitant to
converse through social media.71 Once these students gain confidence by
67

See Katherine Bindley & Timothy Stenovec, Missouri 'Facebook Law' Limits TeacherStudent Interactions Online, Draws Criticism And Praise, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8,
2011, 8:58 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/03/missouri-facebook-law_n_916716.html.
68

Christine Greenhow, an assistant professor at the College of Education and the College
of Information Studies at the University of Maryland, whose area of expertise is learning
in social media contexts, notes that social media is students’ “one-stop place for
communication.” Id.
69

Id. For this reason, Greenhow argues that limiting communication between teachers
and students only furthers the gap between a student's in-school life and his or her life
outside of school.
70

See Editorial - Facebook not appropriate for students, teachers, but alternatives
possible, STARNEWS ONLINE (Aug. 5, 2011),
http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20110805/ARTICLES/110809781; see also
Preston, supra note 1.
71

See Bindley & Stenovec, supra note 67.
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interacting through social media, they may more readily participate in
classroom discussions.72
[29] However, teachers’ off-campus use of social media with students is
not without its drawbacks. As previously mentioned, those who advocate
restricting or banning teachers’ use of social media to communicate with
students argue two points. First, these advocates contend that teachers’
use of social media will facilitate inappropriate relationships, particularly
sexual relationships, between teachers and students.73 Second, these
72

See id.

73

See Dariena Bonds, Past sexual misconduct in Missouri: FaceBook ban teachers using
site with students, ALLVOICES (Aug. 23, 2011, 7:21 AM),
http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/10103283-past-sexual-misconduct-inmissouri-facebook-ban-teachers-using-site-with-students; see also States miss a socialmedia opportunity, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2011),
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/states-miss-a-social-media-education-opportunity/20
11/08/16/gIQATbqlQJ_story.html (quoting the Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union who described these types of bans as “taking a bazooka to a fly”). But the
underlying concern is certainly valid. Unfortunately, there is no national public database
of sexual misconduct by teachers. See Preston, supra note 1. The statistics cited in most
media articles are uncertain, however, because no one has ever designed a nationwide
study for the expressed purpose of measuring the prevalence of sexual abuse by
educators. See Brian Palmer, How Many Kids are Sexually Abused by Their Teachers?,
SLATE (Feb. 8, 2012, 7:14 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/02/is_sexual_abuse_in_s
chools_very_common_.html. One impetus behind New York City’s Department of
Education’s policy is a number of incidents of alleged sexual misconduct within City
schools. NYC Teachers Could Soon be Banned from ‘Friending’ Students on Facebook,
CBS N.Y. (Mar. 22, 2012, 6:00 PM),
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/03/22/nyc-teachers-could-soon-be-banned-from-friend
ing-students-on-facebook/
These bans continue to be controversial. With respect to New York City Department of
Education’s (“NYCDOE”) restrictions, NYCDOE’s Chancellor supported the policy but,
at least before its adoption, the Director of Technology Innovation for Manhattan
Schools, who argued that educators need to “interact with young people using the tools of
their world”, opposed it. See Francesca Duffy, Should Teachers Defriend Students?,
EDUCATION WEEK TEACHER (Mar. 28, 2012, 4:16 PM), http://bit.ly/TiiXIT.
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advocates argue that since teachers are “role models,”74 students may lose
respect for a teacher due to a teacher’s inadvertent or deliberate disclosure
of compromising information,75 such as a Facebook photograph of a
teacher drinking while wearing a pirate hat captioned “drunken pirate.”76
In turn, this disclosure may undermine the student’s educational
experience in the classroom. Both of these concerns are heightened since
most American K-12 students are minors.77
[30] The dangers of categorical bans of this type of speech are likely
overstated. With respect to a teacher’s use of social media to develop
inappropriate sexual relationships with a student, which is certainly an
74

Public school teachers have a long history of discrimination based on this role-model
rationale. Although public school teachers are protected under the First Amendment,
their conduct, historically, has been highly regulated. See Fulmer, supra note 10, at ¶ 28.
In 1915, unmarried female teachers were prohibited from smoking cigarettes, dressing in
bright colors, keeping company with men, loitering in front of ice cream stores, wearing
fewer than two petticoats, and riding in any carriage or automobile with any man who
was not an immediate family member. See id. (citing Rules For Teachers --1915, N.H.
HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.nhhistory.org/edu/support/nhgrowingup/teacherrules.pdf (last
visited Nov. 26, 2012)). Currently, most state certification procedures still prohibit
teachers from “engaging in conduct which would discredit the teaching profession.”
Fulmer, supra note 10, at ¶ 28; see also CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-145d-400a(c)(2)(C)
(1998) (requiring teachers to conduct themselves as professionals, avoiding any
misconduct that would impair the teacher’s ability to teach). Most state teaching licenses
contain moral codes governing teacher conduct. See Fulmer, supra note 10, at ¶ 28
(citing Kellie Hayden, Teachers & Social Networking Sites, SUITE101 (May 18, 2008),
http://suite101.com/article/teachers-social-networking-sites-a54245).
75

See Josh Wolford, Should Teachers and Students Be Friends on Facebook?,
WEBPRONEWS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.webpronews.com/should-teachers-andstudents-be-friends-on-facebook-2011-08.
76

See Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
3, 2008).
77

See Susan E. Hume, The American Education System, INT’L STUDENT GUIDE,
http://www.internationalstudentguidetotheusa.com/articles/american_education_system.p
hp (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
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important concern, opponents of categorical bans of this type of speech
argue that it is highly unlikely that a ban on this interaction will reduce
any predatory teacher conduct.78 Moreover, if this conduct occurs,
electronic evidence will exist to prosecute the offense.79 Importantly,
while a few teachers have used social media to foster inappropriate
relationships with students and others have shared questionable
information,80 presumably the overwhelming majority of teachers use
these mediums appropriately.
[31] Furthermore, categorically banning all off-campus teacher to
student speech using social media because some teachers might share
inappropriate information and thus be poor “role models” is a
disproportionate response to the perceived transgression, akin to “killing a
fly with a bazooka.”81 As this Article will discuss, there are better ways to
address these issues.

78

See Anita Ramasastry, Can Teachers and Their Students Be Banned from Becoming
Facebook Friends?, JUSTIA.COM (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/09/13/can-teachers-and-their-students-be-banned-from-bec
oming-facebook-friends.
79

See Mark L. Krotoski & Jason Passwaters, Using Log Record Analysis to Show
Internet and Computer Activity in Criminal Cases, 59 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 12 (2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5906.pdf (stating
web access logs can essentially retrace a Facebook user’s activity on the site).
80

Documented abuse issues have been facilitated through social media. See generally
Jordan Bienstock, Students, Teachers and Social Networking, CNN (Jan. 20, 2012, 2:38
PM),
http://schoolsofthought.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/20/students-teachers-and-social-networki
ng. But it is unclear whether the abuse would have occurred in the absence of a teacher’s
use of social media. Once again, in the absence of evidence linking teachers’ use of
social media with sexually predatory behavior, school districts should be apprehensive
about curtailing teachers’ use of social media.
81

See States miss a social-media education opportunity, supra note 73 (quoting the
American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri’s legal director, Tony Rothert).
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[32] Notably, any bans or restrictions on teachers’ use of social media
to communicate with students will be difficult to draft and costly to
enforce. Would only “traditional” social media mediums like Facebook or
MySpace count? What about new technologies? Who would monitor the
sites? Even assuming school districts could effectively monitor teachers’
social media usage, this monitoring would likely be time-consuming and
costly.
[33] Categorical bans on teachers’ use of social media with students fail
to recognize that social media, in some form, are here to stay. As a recent
New York Supreme Court Judge observed, Facebook has rapidly evolved
from a platform used solely by American college students to a worldwide
social and professional network, which is commonly used to advertise
businesses, organize parties, debate politics, and air grievances.82 Social
media and blogs continue to dominate Americans’ online activity,
accounting for nearly a quarter of all time spent online.83 Nearly four in
five Internet users visit social networks and blogs.84 Americans now
spend more time on Facebook than they do on any other webpage.85 As
the technologies behind social media continue to evolve, the challenges of
monitoring any bans or restrictions on teachers’ speech would likely
increase as well.
[34] Given that the benefits of teacher off-campus communications with
students are likely understated and the dangers overstated, and given that
the costs of implementing and monitoring these bans may be significant,
82

Rubino v. City of N.Y., No. 107292/11, 2012 WL 373101, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1,
2012) (citing Somini Sengupta & Evelyn Rusli, Personal Data’s Value? Facebook Set to
Find Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/technology/riding-personal-data-facebook-is-goingpublic.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).
83

See State of the Media: The Social Media Report Q3 2011, supra note 11.

84

See id.

85

See id.
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school officials should be wary of censuring this speech, even if this
censorship is allowed under the First Amendment.86 School districts do
not ban teacher-to-student communications on Main Street; they should
not ban these communications using other newer mediums either.
IV. CURRENT FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYZING
TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
[35] The framework for analyzing teacher free speech cases with
respect to teachers’ off-campus rights under the United States Constitution
is evolving. To date, there is little case authority examining teacher free
speech rights with respect to communications with students using social
media. But given the widespread attempts to ban or limit teacher to
student speech using social media, courts will be forced to address this
issue sooner rather than later.87
[36] Due to the current paucity of authority, confusion exists as to what
proper analytical framework courts should employ to evaluate these free
speech disputes, though it is likely that courts will use the public employee
framework or some variation of it in this context.88 Of course, other
potential frameworks also exist and this Article will briefly discuss these
approaches as well.

86

See infra Part XIII (concluding that categorical bans of off-campus teacher to student
speech using social media are likely unconstitutional).
87

Courts might have an easier time with this issue if there were consensus regarding the
limits of teacher speech on-campus and the limits of student speech off-campus. But
these areas of law are evolving simultaneously.
88

See infra Part IV.A.
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A. Public Employee Framework89
[37] Public employees can challenge government restrictions of their
free speech rights in two basic ways. First, although a relatively rare
occurrence, an employee can bring a facial challenge to the regulation
based on overbreadth or vagueness grounds.90 Second, the employee can
bring an as-applied challenge to the regulation as a retaliatory discharge
claim.91
[38] Most public employee claims brought under this framework are
retaliatory discharge claims.92 To state a retaliatory discharge claim based
on a violation of free speech rights, a teacher would need to establish the
following:93 (1) her speech was made outside of her official duties rather
89

Historically, public employees had no right to object to conditions placed on
employment, including those restricting the exercise of constitutional rights. See
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); see also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S.
485, 496 (1952) (upholding a New York law empowering the Board of Regents to
dismiss teachers who were members of the Communist party or other organizations
advocating the overthrow of the United States government). As Justice Holmes once
remarked, “‘A policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.’” Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-44 (quoting McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)). As discussed infra, Justice
Holmes’ observation is no longer an accurate statement of the law.
90

See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); see also L.A. Police Dep’t v.
United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999).
91

See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 587 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Santa Monica
Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006)).
92

See STEVEN BADERIAN, TRENDS IN THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT RETALIATION AND
WHISTLEBLOWING, CNA PRO (2011), available at http://www.cnapro.com/pdf/EPL%20%20Retaliation%20and%20Whistleblowing%20%28JacksonLewis%29%209-7-11.pdf.
93

The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to articulate, post Garcetti, a test for
evaluating a public employee’s retaliatory discharge claim based on a violation of the
employee’s First Amendment free speech rights. Circuit Courts, however, generally
apply a five-part test to examine these claims: (1) Did the employee speak pursuant to the
employee’s official job duties?; (2) Did the employee’s speech implicate a matter of
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than pursuant to her official duties, (2) her speech implicated a public
concern, and (3) school officials took an adverse employment action that
was substantially motivated by her speech.94 If the teacher meets this
evidentiary threshold, school officials, in order to regulate her speech,
would need to establish that (1) the school’s interests in providing efficient
services outweigh the teacher’s interests in commenting on these matters
and the student’s interests in hearing the speech, or (2) school officials
would have taken the adverse employment action even in the absence of
the protected speech.95 The challenges with respect to this test are
evidenced by lower courts’ struggles to determine whether these elements
are questions of law, fact, or both.96
public concern?; (3) Did the government take an adverse employment action that was
substantially motivated by the speech?; (4) Did the government’s interests in providing
efficient services outweigh the citizen’s interests in commenting on these matters and the
public’s interests in hearing the speech?; and (5) Would the government have taken the
adverse employment action even in the absence of the protected speech? See, e.g., Eng v.
Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009); Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 105 (2d
Cir. 2011). Courts sometimes analyze these elements in different orders, and the test is
often phrased in slightly different terms. See, e.g., Nagle, 663 F.3d at 105 (quoting
Cotarelo v. Vill. of Sleepy Hollow Police Dep't, 460 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2006)).
94

The plaintiff must establish the first three elements. See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of
Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 337-38 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3068 (2011); Eng,
552 F.3d at 1070-71.
95

If the plaintiff succeeds in meeting this threshold, the burden of production shifts to the
government to establish the last two elements. See Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071-72; Nagle, 663
F.3d at 105.
96

The issues of whether the government took an adverse employment action that was
substantially motivated by the speech and whether the government would have taken the
adverse employment action even in the absence of the protected speech are typically
treated as issues for the fact finder. See Morris v. City of Colo. Springs, 666 F.3d 654,
661 (10th Cir. 2012). Whether a public employee’s speech implicated a public concern is
a question of law. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 n.7 (1983). Whether the
employee spoke as a citizen rather than pursuant to her official job duties is generally
treated as a mixed question of law and fact. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 28, § 2:20
n.188.02. Finally, whether the government’s interest in providing efficient services
outweighs the citizen’s interests in communicating on these matters and the public’s
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1. Teacher Speech Cases
[39] The current public employee law framework makes no distinction
between the speech rights of teachers and those of other public
employees;97 the following two Supreme Court cases involving teacher
speech rights are discussed first for convenience purposes only.
a. Teacher Off-Campus Speech:
Pickering v. Board of Education
[40] The seminal case governing teacher off-campus free speech rights
under the United States Constitution is Pickering.98 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court held that Pickering’s speech criticizing school officials
was protected under the First Amendment.99 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court refused to provide a definitive test governing when a teacher’s
off-campus speech can be limited.100 However, the Supreme Court did
provide some general guidelines, including a general analytical framework
for analyzing whether a teacher’s off-campus speech is protected under the
First Amendment.101
[41]

Under the guidelines set out in the Pickering decision, at least as

interests in hearing the speech is a question of law or fact is unresolved. See id. (noting a
federal circuit split). This Article will not focus on issues solely within the province of
the fact finder.
97

See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1968); Connick, 461 U.S. at
142-43.
98

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

99

Id. at 574-75.

100

See id. at 568-70.

101

Id. at 569-73.
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modified by later case law,102 a teacher’s speech is protected if it satisfies
a two-part test. First, the teacher’s speech must involve a matter of
legitimate public concern.103 Second, if the speech does involve a matter
of legitimate public concern, a court should employ a balancing test to
determine whether the employer’s interests in prohibiting the speech
outweigh the teacher’s interests in making the speech.104 If the speech
meets both parts of this test, it is protected under the First Amendment.105
[42] The situation in Pickering predates social media.106 In this case,
Marvin L. Pickering, an Illinois public school teacher, was dismissed from
his teaching position for sending a letter to a newspaper regarding a
recently proposed tax increase to support the district schools.107 In his
letter, Pickering objected to the tax increase, which was earmarked for
building schools.108 Pickering wrote the letter in response to articles
supporting the passage of the tax increase and following a vote that
102

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).

103

Id. at 147-48. Some commentators have concluded that Pickering did not require
speech implicating a public concern. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, Beyond “Public
Concern”: New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249,
257 (1990) (observing that “public concern” was merely one of several factors in the
analysis); Karin B. Hoppmann, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better
Definition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 996 (1997)
(noting that while Pickering did refer to speech upon matters of “public concern,” it
never identified the degree of public concern required).
104

See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-74.

105

See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466-67 (1995).

106

It even predates the rumor Vice President Al Gore invented the Internet. See
Transcript: Vice-President Gore on CNN’s ‘Late Edition’, CNN (Mar. 9, 1999 5:06 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/09/president.2000/transcript.gore/.
107

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.

108

Id. at 566.
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defeated the tax increase.109 In essence, Pickering’s letter criticized the
Board of Education’s handling of an earlier bond issue and its subsequent
allocation of financial resources between the school’s educational and
athletic programs.110 The letter also criticized both the Board and the
superintendent’s methods of informing the district’s taxpayers of the
reasons why additional tax revenue was needed.111
In addition,
Pickering’s letter charged the superintendent of schools with attempting to
prevent teachers in the district from criticizing the bond issue.112 Some of
Pickering’s criticism was based on inaccurate information.113
[43] Pickering was dismissed from his teaching position and he
challenged his dismissal, claiming that his letter was protected speech
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.114 Following a full hearing, the Board of Education rejected
his claims.115 His subsequent appeals to both the Illinois trial court and
the Illinois Supreme Court were denied.116 The United States Supreme
Court eventually reversed the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision.117
[44]

The Supreme Court rejected the notion that teachers are not

109

Id. at 565-66.

110

Id. at 569.

111

Id. at 566.

112

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.

113

Id. at 570, 582.

114

Id. at 564-65.

115

Id. at 565.

116

See id.

117

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565.
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entitled to First Amendment rights, reasoning that “the public interest in
having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance . . . is a
core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”118
Consistent with this principle, the Court strove to balance the interests of
the teacher, as a citizen commenting on matters of public concern, and the
interests of the State, as an employer promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.119 Noting the myriad
situations in which teachers can criticize their superiors, the Court refused
to provide a “general standard against which all such statements may be
judged.”120 However, the Court did provide some guidance for analyzing
these issues.121
[45] First, the Supreme Court determined whether the subject involved
a matter of legitimate public concern.122 Without defining the phrase
“legitimate public concern,” the Court concluded that the question of
whether a school system requires additional funding is a matter of
legitimate public concern.123 On such a question, the Court observed that
“free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate.”124 The Court reasoned that teachers as a class are members of
the community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to
how things such as school funds should be allocated; therefore, it is
essential that teachers be able to speak freely on such questions.125
118

Id. at 573.

119

See id. at 568.

120

Id. at 569.

121

See id.

122

See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571.

123

Id.

124

Id. at 571-72.

125

Id. at 572.
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[46] Because the letter’s subject involved a matter of legitimate public
concern, the Court then examined whether the employer’s interest in
prohibiting the speech outweighed the teacher’s right to speak, focusing
on the letter’s impact on workplace relationships and Pickering’s work
responsibilities.126 In short, the Court examined whether the actual or
potential disruption to Pickering’s workplace caused by his letter
outweighed his free speech rights. More specifically, the Court examined
whether the speech would create conflict with his co-workers or
supervisors, destroy the relationship of loyalty and trust required in the
employment context, or interfere with the employee’s performance.127
The Court found the disruption to his employer caused by the letter was
minimal for a number of reasons. First, Pickering’s statements were not
directed at a particular person with whom Pickering would be in contact
during his daily work as a teacher.128 Consequently, the Court concluded
that Pickering’s case did not involve any issue of discipline by his
immediate supervisors at school and Pickering’s actions did not disrupt
any harmony among co-workers.129 Second, Pickering’s speech did not
impede his performance of his daily duties in the classroom nor did it
interfere with the regular operations of the school.130 Notably, the Court
did not find any disruption to the workplace even though some of
Pickering’s criticism was inaccurate.131
[47] Furthermore, the school administration’s interests in limiting a
teacher’s opportunity to engage in public debate are further limited when
126

Id. at 569-70.

127

See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Free Speech Rights of K-12 Teachers After Garcetti, 269
EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (2011).
128

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70.

129

Id. at 570. Of course, Pickering was disciplined; he was fired. Id. at 564.

130

See id. at 572-73.

131

Id. at 570.
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the teacher is speaking as a member of the general public.132 Where the
fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the
subject matter of the teacher’s public communication, the Court concluded
that it is necessary to treat the teacher as a member of the general
public.133 Thus, absent proof that the teacher’s statements were knowingly
or recklessly false, a teacher has a right to speak on issues of public
importance.134 Consequently, his erroneous statements criticizing his
employer on a matter of legitimate public concern were protected
speech.135
[48] Notably, the opinion is silent as to where and when Pickering
wrote his letter and who read it. Presumably, however, his letter was not
written at the school during instructional time.136 Also, some members of
Pickering’s audience were likely students in the school, possibly even his
students. The Court did not qualify its holding even though Pickering’s
audience likely included some minors.
b. Teacher On-Campus Speech: Givhan v.
Western Line Consolidated School District
[49] More than a decade after deciding Pickering, the Supreme Court
decided Givhan, using Givhan to further explain Pickering.137 Unlike
Pickering, Givhan did not involve a public communication, off-campus
132

See id. at 573.

133

See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.

134

See id. at 574.

135

See id.

136

See generally Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (discussing the content and publication of the
letter). The briefs filed with the Supreme Court are also silent as to where and when
Pickering wrote his letter.
137

See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979).
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speech, or even teacher-to-student speech.138 While both Givhan’s speech
and Pickering’s speech implicated a matter of legitimate public concern,139
Givhan’s speech, unlike Pickering’s speech, was communicated privately
to a school administrator during working hours.140 In short, Givhan held
that when a public employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of general
concern, the speech is protected under the First Amendment, even if the
speech is made privately.141
[50] The district court in Givhan ordered the teacher’s reinstatement,
finding that the primary reason Bessie B. Givhan was discharged was due
to her criticism of the policies and practices of the school district,
especially the school in which she was assigned to teach.142 She focused
her complaints on the school’s alleged racially discriminatory policies and
practices.143 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order
reinstating Givhan, concluding that because Givhan had privately
expressed her concerns to the principal, her expression was not protected
under the First Amendment.144 The Fifth Circuit ultimately “concluded
that there is no constitutional right to press even good ideas on an
unwilling recipient.”145

138

Id. at 412-13.

139

See id. at 414.

140

Id. at 412.

141

Id. at 415-16. A critical, enduring aspect of Givhan is that a public employee’s private
speech can be protected under the First Amendment.
142

Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412-13.

143

Id. at 413.

144

Id.

145

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

31

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIX, Issue 2

[51] The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that a public employee
does not forfeit her First Amendment freedoms if she decides to express
her views privately rather than publicly.146 The Court observed that the
First Amendment’s protections of government employees extends to
private as well as public expression.147
[52] However, the Court noted that “striking the Pickering balance in
each context may involve different considerations.”148 The Court stated,
“When a teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the content of the
statements that must be assessed to determine whether they ‘in any way
either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the
classroom . . . or interfered with the regular operation of schools
generally.’”149 On the other hand, when a teacher speaks privately, this
communication “may in some situations bring additional factors to the
Pickering calculus.”150 For example, the Court noted that “[w]hen a
government employee personally confronts her immediate superior, the
employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by
the content of the employee’s message but also by the manner, time, and
place in which it is delivered.”151 Importantly, the Court, even in the
context of private speech, focused on the impact of the speech on the
workplace.152
146

Id. at 413-14.

147

Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413.

148

Id. at 415 n.4.

149

Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968)).

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414 n.3, 415 n.5. Ultimately, the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its Mount Healthy
decision, which was decided after the district court’s decision in Givhan. Id. at 417; see
also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
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2. Other Relevant Public Employee Speech Cases
a. Public Employee Speech Outside the
Workplace: NTEU and City of San Diego
[53] Under the public-employee framework, the Supreme Court cases
do not clarify the extent of First Amendment protection for off-duty public
employees. In particular, the cases do not provide clear guidance on the
degree of public concern that the employee’s speech must implicate, nor
do they explain how closely the off-duty speech must relate to the
employee’s official work duties.153
[54] With respect to non-teacher public employee speech occurring
outside the workplace, the Supreme Court’s leading decisions, United
States v. National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU”)154 and City of
San Diego v. Roe,155 are, on one level, easy to reconcile. In NTEU, the
Supreme Court held that a ban on honoraria for public employees was
unconstitutional even if the speech was work-related because this speech
might implicate a public concern and pass the Pickering balancing test.156
Although the district court had concluded that Givhan’s protected speech played a
substantial role in the school district’s decision not to rehire her, the district court did not
make any findings concerning whether the school district established, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the
protected speech; therefore, the Court remanded the case. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 417.
153

See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government
Employees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117, 2130 (2010).
154

United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 n.10, 477 (1995)
(holding that a ban on honoraria for public employees was unconstitutional even if the
speech was work-related because this speech might implicate a public concern and pass
the Pickering balancing test).
155

City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 84 (2004) (holding that a police officer’s
speech could be censored because his speech did not implicate a public concern).
156

Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 466 n.10, 477.
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The Court in City of San Diego held that a police officer’s speech could be
censored because his speech did not implicate a “public concern.”157
[55] However, on another level, one implication of these cases is
potentially worrisome. In NTEU, Congress, at least in part, sought to
regulate federal employees’ speech when the speech was related to the
employees’ job responsibilities and thus could directly impact the work
environment.158 In NTEU, the Supreme Court held this regulation
unconstitutional.159 By contrast, in City of San Diego, the police
department sought to regulate an “off-duty” officer’s speech even though
the nexus between the officer’s speech and his job was, at best,
attenuated.160 Nevertheless, the Court held that the officer’s speech was
unprotected.161 These cases raise some question as to how closely the
speech regulation must relate to the employee’s work responsibilities.162

157

City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 80, 84. However, if “public concern” is defined
broadly to include everything that might concern the public, the Court’s holding in City
of San Diego is more difficult to understand because even prurient speech might
implicate a “public concern.” See Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2140-42; see also infra
Part X(B)(1).
158

See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 459-60.

159

Id. at 457.

160

See City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 79, 81.

161

Id. at 79-80.

162

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that a government entity has far
greater leeway to regulate an employee’s speech than to regulate a citizen’s speech. See
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1994). In City of San Diego, the nexus
between the police officer’s speech and his job responsibilities was attenuated. Thus, the
San Diego Police Department, in regulating his speech, was regulating speech on the
outer fringes of the employment relationship: in short, the San Diego Police Department
was acting almost in a “sovereign” capacity.

34

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIX, Issue 2

i. United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union
[56] In NTEU, the Supreme Court held that a congressional ban
prohibiting almost all federal employees from receiving honoraria for
making speeches or writing articles violated the plaintiff-respondents’
First Amendment free speech rights.163 In essence, the ban restricted a
federal employee from accepting honoraria for this expression even when
the expression was unrelated to work.164 The ban did not directly
“prohibit[] any speech nor discriminate[] among speakers based on the
content or viewpoint of their message[].”165 However, the Court
concluded that the “prohibition on compensation unquestionably
impose[d] a significant burden on expressive activity,” and therefore
violated the First Amendment.166
[57] In NTEU, the Justices agreed that Pickering-Connick provided the
proper test to evaluate the plaintiff-respondents’ facial challenge to
Section 501(b) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.167 The majority
held that the ban in Section 501(b) was overbroad, regulating more speech
than allowed under the Pickering-Connick test.168 First, based on the
types of speech for which public employees had previously received
honoraria, the Court concluded that much of the banned speech would
qualify as citizen-expression on matters of public concern rather than
employee-expression on matters of personal interest.169 Importantly, the
163

Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 457.

164

See id.

165

Id. at 468.

166

Id.

167

Id. at 465-66.

168

See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 466-70.

169

Id. at 466.
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Court concluded that a public employee speaks as a citizen on matters of
public concern when the employee’s speech is addressed to a public
audience, is made outside of the workplace, and involves content largely
unrelated to the employee’s government work.170
[58] Furthermore, with respect to the second part of the PickeringConnick test, which concerns the balancing of the employees’ free speech
interests against the employers’ interests in an efficient workplace, the
Court concluded that the Pickering calculus weighed heavily in favor of
the plaintiff-respondents.171 The Court observed that the government’s
burden was heavy because the honoraria ban was a “wholesale deterrent to
a broad category of expression by a massive number of potential
speakers.”172 Furthermore, the government was required to show that the
ban would affect actual workplace efficiency.173 The Court concluded that
the honoraria ban would deter an enormous quantity of speech based only
on speculation that it might threaten the government’s interest, and the
government had provided no evidence of misconduct related to honoraria
in the “vast rank and file of federal employees” it covered.174
Furthermore, because the vast majority of the speech at issue presumably
would not involve the subject matter of government employment and
would take place outside the workplace, the government could not justify
the ban on the grounds of immediate workplace disruption based on
Pickering and its progeny.175 In particular, the Court observed that the
speech did not address audiences composed of co-workers or supervisors,
but rather involved speech for the general public, further limiting any
170

Id.

171

See id. at 477.

172

Id. at 467.

173

Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 467 n.11.

174

Id. at 472.

175

Id. at 470.
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workplace impact effects.176 Ultimately, the Court held that the
speculative benefits the honoraria ban might provide the government were
insufficient to justify the burden on the plaintiff-respondents’
expression.177
ii. City of San Diego v. Roe
[59] The police officer’s speech in City of San Diego was made outside
the workplace and did not involve any workplace grievance issues.178 The
Supreme Court applied the Pickering-Connick test, holding that the
officer’s speech did not touch on a matter of public concern and therefore
was not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.179 The
circumstances in City of San Diego, however, were rather extreme. The
police officer’s speech was commercial speech and, at least in the Court’s
view, exploited his status as a city police officer.180 Crucial to the Court’s
decision was the fact that the officer’s speech did not inform the public
about any aspect of the functioning of the San Diego Police
Department.181

176

Id. at 465.

177

Id. at 477. Justice O’Connor, concurring in the judgment, explained that section
501(b) involved a ban on off-hour speech that did not relate to internal office affairs or
the employee’s status as an employee. Id. at 480 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)). Justice O’Connor added that “[a]s the
magnitude of intrusion on an employee’s [or at least off-duty employee’s] interests rises,
so does the [g]overnment’s burden of justification.” Id. at 483 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 150).
178

543 U.S. 77, 81 (2004).

179

Id. at 84.

180

Id.

181

Id.
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[60] In this case, the City of San Diego terminated a police officer for
selling videotapes he made and for other related activity.182 The tapes
showed the respondent engaging in sexually explicit acts, including
stripping off a police uniform.183 The uniform was not the specific
uniform of his employer, the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”), but
it was identifiable as a police uniform.184 He sold his videos as well as
police equipment, including official uniforms of the SDPD, on his EBay
account.185 His account indicated that he was employed in law
enforcement.186
[61] After Roe’s activities on eBay were discovered, the SDPD held a
hearing and Roe was directed to stop displaying, manufacturing,
distributing, or selling any sexually explicit materials.187 Roe removed
some material from his account, but he did not fully comply with this
directive.188 The SDPD then terminated Roe.189 Roe sued, claiming the
SDPD violated his First Amendment free speech rights when it discharged
him.190
[62]

The lower courts disagreed as to whether Roe’s speech implicated

182

Id. at 78.

183

City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 78.

184

Id.

185

Id.

186

Id.

187

Id. at 79.

188

City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 79.

189

Id.

190

Id.
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a public concern.191 The district court held that the sexually explicit, made
for-profit videos did not involve a "matter of public concern."192 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Roe’s conduct fell
within the protected category of citizen commentary on matters of public
concern.193 Central to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion was that Roe’s
expression did not involve an internal workplace grievance, took place
while he was off duty and away from his employer’s premises, and was
unrelated to his employment.194
[63] The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision,
holding that Roe’s claim failed for two reasons.195 First, the Supreme
Court reasoned that Roe’s claim failed under the line of cases protecting a
public employee’s speech when the speech is made on the employee’s
own time on topics unrelated to employment.196 In these circumstances,
the speech is entitled to First Amendment protection unless the
government can justify its regulation based on something “‘far stronger
than mere speculation.’”197 The Supreme Court reasoned that this line of
cases, culminating in NTEU, did not control Roe’s case because the
speech involved in these cases was unrelated to the claimant’s
employment and had no effect on the employer’s mission.198 In City of
191

Id.

192

Id.

193

City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 79-80.

194

Id.

195

Id. at 81-82, 84.

196

Id. at 80.

197

Id. (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 455 (1995)).

198

City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 80 (citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at
459).
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San Diego, the SDPD had demonstrated substantial interests of its own
that were compromised by Roe’s expression.199 In short, Roe took
“deliberate steps to link his videos and other wares to his police work,” all
in ways injurious to his employer.200 The use of a police uniform, the law
enforcement reference in his web site, the listing of the speaker as “‘in the
field of law enforcement,’” and the debased parody of an officer
performing indecent acts while in the course of his official duties, all
served to bring the mission of his employer and the professionalism of its
officers into serious disrepute.201 Consequently, although the speech was
made on the employee’s own time and did not involve any particular
work-related dispute with the SDPD, the speech was “linked to his official
status as a police officer” and “designed to exploit his employer’s
image.”202 Thus, Roe’s speech detrimentally affected the employer’s
mission.203
[64] Second, after concluding that Pickering-Connick provided the
proper framework for analyzing Roe’s claim, the Supreme Court held that
his speech was not protected because the videos did not implicate a
“matter of public concern,” which typically involve matters of government
policy that are of interest to the public at large.204 The Court noted that the
“boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined.”205 In
reaching its holding, the Court reasoned that the interests being protected
under Pickering-Connick are as much about the public’s interest in
199

Id. at 81.

200

Id.

201

Id. (quoting Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004)).

202

Id. at 84.

203

City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 84.

204

Id. at 80-82.

205

Id. at 83.
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receiving informed opinion as they are about the employee’s own right to
disseminate it.206 Relying on its earlier decision in Connick, the Court
examined “the ‘content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record’” to assess whether the employee's speech
addressed a matter of public concern.207
[65] The Supreme Court explained that “public concern” is something
that is a subject of “legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general
interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of
publication.”208 Therefore, even certain private remarks made at the
workplace during working hours, such as negative comments about the
President of the United States, “touch on matters of public concern” and
should thus be analyzed under Pickering-Connick.209
[66] The Court had little difficulty holding that Roe’s expression did
“not qualify as a matter of public concern” under any interpretation of the
public concern test.210 In particular, Roe’s speech did nothing to inform
the public about any aspect of the SDPD’s functioning or operation.211
Nor was his speech anything like the speech in Rankin v. McPherson,
where a co-worker commented privately on political news.212 Roe’s
206

Id. at 82.

207

Id. at 83 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).

208

City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83-84.

209

Id. at 84.

210

Id.

211

Id.

212

Compare id., with Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381, 392 (1987) (holding that
a clerical employee’s remark, made privately in a county constable’s office and never
disseminated to the public, was protected speech) (The employee, after hearing of an
attempt on the life of then President Reagan, said, “[I]f they go for him again, I hope they
get him.”). Rankin was a pre-Garcetti case. If Rankin were decided today, it would
likely be decided under Garcetti.
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expression was widely broadcast, linked to his official status as a police
officer, and designed to exploit his employer’s image.213 Consequently,
Roe’s speech was not protected under the First Amendment.214
b. Public Employee Speech Within the
Workplace: Connick and Garcetti
[67] The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding non-teacher public
employee speech within the workplace leave a number of questions
unanswered. In particular, the Court has not provided guidance on when a
public employee acts pursuant to the employee’s official duties215 and the
Court has not clarified the extent to which Garcetti modifies Connick.
[68] In Connick, the Supreme Court observed that Pickering’s
balancing test applies only when the employee spoke “as a citizen upon
matters of public concern" rather than "as an employee upon matters” only
of private interest.216 In Garcetti, the Supreme Court held that when a
public employee speaks pursuant to the employee’s "official duties," the
First Amendment does not protect the employee’s speech, regardless of
whether the speech implicates a public concern.217 While Garcetti
represented an opportunity to clarify this area of law, many commentators
agree the opinion did not achieve this result.218
213

City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 84.

214

See id.

215

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (refusing to provide a
comprehensive framework for determining when an employee speaks pursuant to the
employee’s official duties).
216

461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).

217

547 U.S. at 422.

218

See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v.
Ceballos in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 EDUC. L. REP. 357, 358 (2011).
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i. Connick v. Myers
[69] In early 1983, the Supreme Court explained the parameters of
speech involving "public concern" more fully, ultimately holding in a 5-4
decision that the First Amendment did not protect a state employee when
she circulated a questionnaire concerning internal office affairs.219 Sheila
Myers was employed by the District Attorney’s Office.220 At work, she
finalized a questionnaire soliciting “the views of her fellow staff members
concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees
felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”221 Myers distributed the
survey at work.222 Although some surveys were distributed during lunch,
others were distributed during working hours.223 Myers was subsequently
discharged.224
[70] The district court found that Myers’ distribution of the
questionnaire was the real reason for her termination.225 The district court
then held that the questionnaire involved matters of public concern and
that the state had not “‘clearly demonstrated’ that the survey ‘substantially
interfered’” with the operations of the District Attorney’s Office.226 The

219

Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.

220

Id. at 140.

221

Id. at 141.

222

Id.

223

See id. at 153 & n.13.

224

Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.

225

Id. at 142.

226

Id.
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Fifth Circuit affirmed.227
[71] The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Myers’ speech was
unprotected despite reaffirming that speech on public issues occupies the
“‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”228 In
reaching this result, the Court established a two-part test for determining
whether a public employee’s speech receives First Amendment
protection.229 First, the public employee’s speech must implicate a public
concern.230 Second, if the employee’s speech does involve a public
concern, a court should determine whether the employer’s interests in
prohibiting the speech outweigh the employee’s interests in speaking and
the audience’s interest in hearing the speech.231 Thus, a public employee’s
speech is protected if it involves a "public concern" and on balance, the
speaker and audience’s interests in the speech outweigh, or are at least
equal to, the employer’s interests.232
[72] In determining whether the speech could be fairly characterized as
constituting speech on a matter of public concern, the Court explained that
if speech cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community, it can be regulated.233 The
227

Id.

228

Id. at 145, 154 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913
(1982)).
229

Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, 146, 149-50.

230

Id. at 144-45. See generally 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM
18:10 (2012) (citing Nichol v. Arin Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d
536, 557 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“‘Public concern’ is a term of art under the Pickering-Connick
test, a term ‘measured more by what it is not than by what it is.’”)).
OF SPEECH §

231

See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968)).
232

See id. at 154.

233

Id. at 146.
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Court, however, avoided drawing any bright lines, noting that its holding
should not be read to suggest that speech on private matters falls into one
of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression which carry so little
social value, such as obscenity, that the state can prohibit this expression
by all persons in the jurisdiction.234 The Court observed that when a
public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern,
but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not an appropriate forum.235
Further, the Court explained that “[w]hether an employee’s speech
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by examining the
content, form, and context of a given statement as revealed by the whole
record.”236 This inquiry into the protected status of speech is “one of law,
not fact.”237
[73] Because one of the matters in Myers’ survey did touch on a matter
of public concern, namely whether attorneys in the office were pressured
to work in political campaigns, the Court moved onto the second part of
the Pickering test—balancing the interests of both the employer and the
employee—ultimately holding that these interests weighed in the
employer’s favor.238 The Court noted that “[w]hen close working
relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide
degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”239 The
Court cautioned that “a stronger showing may be necessary if the
employee’s speech more substantially involved matters of public
234

Id. at 147.

235

Id.

236

Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.

237

Id. at 148 n.7.

238

See id. at 149-52.

239

Id. at 151-52.
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concern.”240
[74] In balancing the competing interests under the second part of the
Pickering test, the Court weighed Myers’ free speech interests against her
employer’s interests in curtailing her speech.241 In the second part of the
test, the “manner, time and place” of the employee’s statement is again
relevant, as is the context in which the dispute arose.242 In particular, with
respect to the employer’s interests, the Court examined “whether the
statement impair[ed] discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, ha[d] a detrimental impact on close working relationships for
which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impede[d] the
performance of the speaker’s duties or interfere[d] with the regular
operation of the enterprise.”243
[75] The majority opinion concluded that Myers’ questions were not
aimed at helping the public evaluate the performance of a government
agency but rather at "gathering ammunition" for a battle with Myers’
supervisors regarding her transfer.244 The majority observed that Myers’
supervisors were not required to wait until the office was disrupted and
working relationships destroyed before quelling, in the words of a
supervisor, Myers’ “mini-insurrection.”245
[76]

The manner, time, and place in which the questionnaire was

240

Id. at 152.

241

See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140, 154.

242

See id. at 152-53.

243

Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 570-73 (1968)); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-54.
244

See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.

245

See id. at 151-52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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distributed were crucial to the Court’s disposition.246 Although the Court
found that Myers’ questionnaire did not impede her ability to perform her
job responsibilities,247 she did prepare and distribute the questionnaire at
the office, and the manner of distribution required Myers to leave her
work and for others to do the same in order to complete it.248 This
supports the idea that the functioning of the office was disrupted.249
Finally, the Court observed that “[e]mployee speech which transpires
entirely on the employee’s own time, and in non-work areas of the office,
may bring different factors into the Pickering calculus.”250
[77] The context in which the dispute arose is also significant.251 This
was not a case where an employee, out of purely academic interest,
circulated a questionnaire.252 Therefore, Myers’ survey was “most
accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal
office policy.”253 Again, the Court refused to lay down a general standard

246

See id. at 152-53. The majority opinion ignored Justice Brennan’s critique that the
context of the message is used twice in the Pickering analysis - both in determining
whether the speech was political and in evaluating the competing interests in allowing or
prohibiting the speech. See id. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
would have defined public concern more broadly than the majority: “public concern”
means “’to supply the public need for information and education with respect to the
significant issues of our times.’” See id. at 164 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247

Id. at 151.

248

Id. at 153.

249

See Connick, 461 U.S. at 153.

250

Id. at 153 n.13.

251

Id. at 153.

252

Id.

253

Id. at 154.
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for deciding all such cases.254
ii. Garcetti v. Ceballos
[78] The Court’s decision in Garcetti has been widely criticized.255
However, one positive aspect of the decision is that it attempts to clarify
when an employee speaks as a “citizen.”256 In short, a public employee
speaks as a citizen when the speech is not made “pursuant to his official
duties.”257
[79] In Garcetti, the Court held by a 5-4 margin that the First
Amendment does not protect a public employee’s speech when the speech
is made “pursuant to [the employee’ s] official duties.”258 However, the
254

Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. In a later decision, the Court, observed that lower courts
have struggled to apply the Pickering-Connick test. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410, 418 (2006) (“[C]onducting these [Pickering-Connick] inquiries has sometimes
proved difficult.”).
255

See Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 631, 631 & n.6 (as the title indicates, concluding
otherwise, but observing that most academic discussion is highly critical).
256

See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-22.

257

Id. at 421.

258

Id. Justice Stevens advocated a broader test, emphasizing that the answer to whether
the First Amendment protects public employee speech, even when the speech is made
pursuant to the employee’s official duties, should be “sometimes” rather than “never.”
Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Souter’s
dissent echoed this sentiment, cautioning that “when constitutional interests clash, [courts
should] resist the demand for winner-take-all; [instead, they should] try to make
adjustments that serve all of the values at stake.” Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter would protect public employee speech if the speech involved “comment on
official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or
threats to health and safety.” See id. at 435. Justice Breyer concluded that because
Ceballos’s speech was governed by professional canons and supported by special
constitutional considerations regarding professional duties, the need to protect the speech
is augmented, and the speech should be protected unless it fails the Pickering balancing
test. See id. at 447 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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parties in Garcetti agreed that the plaintiff, Richard Ceballos, spoke
pursuant to his official duties.259 The Supreme Court refused to provide a
comprehensive framework for determining when an employee speaks
pursuant to the employee’s official duties.260 Unsurprisingly, lower courts
have struggled to apply the Garcetti holding.261
[80] Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti did not involve
a teacher, lower courts have frequently applied its holding to teacher free
speech claims, at least those arising from on-campus speech.262 Its
relevance to off-campus speech, particularly with respect to public school
teachers, is unclear. At its core, the Court concluded that much like
Connick, Garcetti involved a work-related dispute.263
[81] In Garcetti, the plaintiff, Richard Ceballos, claimed that his free
speech rights were violated when he suffered an adverse employment
action based on memoranda he wrote regarding a pending criminal case.264
During this time, Ceballos was a supervising deputy district attorney.265
At the request of a defense attorney, Ceballos investigated whether an
259

Id. at 424.

260

Id. (noting that since the parties agreed the speech was made pursuant to Ceballos’
official duties, this was not the proper “occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework
for defining the scope of an employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious
debate”).
261

See Bauries & Schach, supra note 218, at 358.

262

See, e.g., Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that
Garcetti barred a teacher’s claim arising from the teacher’s filing of a grievance); Mayer
v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that
Garcetti governed a teacher’s in-class speech).
263

See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420-21.

264

Id. at 414-15.

265

Id. at 413.
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affidavit used to support a search warrant was inaccurate; he concluded it
was.266 Ceballos informed his supervisors of his conclusion and then
wrote a disposition memorandum recommending that the pending charges
be dismissed.267 Nonetheless, his supervisors proceeded with the
prosecution.268 Ceballos claimed that, based on his memorandum, he was
subsequently reassigned to another position, transferred to another
courthouse, and denied a promotion.269
[82] Unlike the lower courts in Connick, the lower courts in Garcetti
split as to whether Ceballos’ speech was protected.270 The district court
granted summary judgment against Ceballos, holding that since Ceballos
wrote his memorandum pursuant to his employment duties, his speech was
not entitled to First Amendment protection.271 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Ceballos’ allegations of
wrongdoing in the memorandum were protected speech.272
[83] The Ninth Circuit employed the Pickering-Connick test, first
concluding that Ceballos’ memorandum satisfied the public concern
requirement.273 Noting that the memorandum did not create any
disruption or inefficiency in the workplace, the Court of Appeals
concluded that, on balance, Ceballos’ memorandum was protected
266

Id. at 413-14.

267

Id. at 414. Ceballos wrote a follow-up memorandum as well. Id.

268

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414.

269

Id. at 415.

270

Id; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1983).

271

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415.

272

Id.

273

Id. at 415-16.
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speech.274
[84] The Supreme Court reversed, adding a new threshold requirement
for public employee speech claims while simultaneously restricting the
application of the Pickering-Connick test.275 The Court noted that the
Pickering-Connick line of public-employee speech cases establishes a
two-part test governing when speech is protected.276 The first prong is
whether the employee speech implicates a matter of public concern.277 If
so, the second prong requires the employer to establish that its interests in
regulating the speech outweigh the employee’s interests in speaking and
the employee’s and audience’s interests in hearing the message.278
However, after Garcetti, in order to reach the Pickering-Connick test, a
public employee must first establish that the employee’s speech was not
made pursuant to his official duties,279 because an employer can regulate
speech made pursuant to a public employee’s official duties.280
[85] In reaching this result, the Supreme Court explained the competing
interests involved in public employee free speech cases.281 An employer
has significant interests in regulating a public employee’s speech.282 First,
274

Id.

275

See id. at 424, 426 (at least with respect to speech made at work during working
hours).
276

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.

277

Id. (finding that if the employee’s speech does not involve a legitimate matter of
public concern, an employer may regulate the employee’s speech).
278

See id.

279

See id. at 421-22.

280

See id. at 422-23.

281

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.

282

See id. at 418-19. While “[a] government entity has broader discretion to restrict
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a public employee “must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom”
because “[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions[]” in
order to provide efficient government services.283 Second, public
employees “often occupy trusted positions in society[,]” and “[w]hen
[these employees] speak out, they can express views that contravene
government policies or impair the proper performance of government
functions.”284 Thus, “[s]upervisors must ensure that their employees’
official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and
promote the employer’s mission.”285
[86] On the other hand, the Supreme Court “has recognized that a
citizen who works for the government is [still] a citizen.”286 “So long as
employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they
must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their
employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”287 “The Court has
acknowledged the importance of promoting the public’s interest in
receiving well-informed views of government employees engaging in
civic discussion.”288 One key premise underlying the Court’s public
speech when it acts in its role as employer,” the Court noted that “the restrictions it
imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s
operations.” Id. at 418.
283

Id. at 418.

284

Id. at 419.

285

Id. at 422-23; cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007). In Morse, the Court
found that a school’s prohibition of student speech at a school event did not violate the
free speech clause because the speech could reasonably be perceived as promoting illegal
drug use. 551 U.S. at 410. The Court justified its holding by observing that the school’s
mission included preventing student drug abuse. Id. at 408-09.
286

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419.

287

Id.

288

Id.
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employee free speech cases is that “while the First Amendment invests
public employees with certain rights, it does not empower them to
‘constitutionalize the employee grievance.’”289
[87] In weighing these concerns in Ceballos’s circumstances, the
Supreme Court explained in detail the factors that were not dispositive in
Garcetti.290 First, it was not dispositive that Ceballos expressed his views
inside his office, rather than publicly, because First Amendment protects
some expression made at work.291 Thus, the Court refused “to hold that
all speech within the office is automatically exposed to restriction.”292
Second, the Court reasoned that even though the subject matter of the
memorandum was Ceballos’s employment, this, too, was not
dispositive.293
[88] The controlling factor, however, was that Ceballos’s “expressions
were made pursuant to his [official] duties.”294 “Ceballos spoke as a
prosecutor fulfilling [his] responsibility to advise his supervisor about how
best to proceed with a pending case . . . .”295 The Court held that when
public employees make “statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.”296
289

Id. at 420 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).

290

Id. at 420-421.

291

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420.

292

Id. at 420-21.

293

Id. at 421.

294

Id.

295

Id.

296

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
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[89] The Court reasoned that “[w]hen he went to work and performed
the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government
employee.”297 He “did not act as a citizen when he went about conducting
his daily professional activities, such as supervising attorneys,
investigating charges, and preparing filings.”298 Nor did he speak as a
citizen when he wrote a memorandum addressing the disposition of a
pending criminal case.299
[90] The Court opined about the danger of undue judicial interference
in government business, noting that a holding in Ceballos’ favor “would
commit the state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive
role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and among
government employees and their superiors in the course of official
business.”300 Additionally, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[w]hen a
public employee speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities . . . there
is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government
employees.”301 Ultimately, the Court concluded that Ceballos wrote the
memorandum pursuant to his official duties.302 The Court declined to
“articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an
297

Id. at 422.

298

Id.

299

Id.

300

Id. at 423.

301

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. Based on some questionable assumptions, the Supreme
Court concluded that a powerful network of legislative enactments, including whistleblower protections laws and labor codes, will likely protect public employees who expose
wrongdoing. See id. at 425. As Justice Souter noted, however, the whistle-blowing and
other worker protection statutes are no substitute for First Amendment protection. See id.
at 439-41 (Souter, J., dissenting). At a minimum, the protection will differ depending on
the local, state, or federal jurisdictions employing the worker. Id.
302

Id. at 424.
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employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious debate.”303
[91] Furthermore, the Court rejected the notion that employers could
curtail public employees’ speech rights by creating excessively broad job
descriptions.304 The Court cautioned that the inquiry into whether speech
is made pursuant to the official duties of a public employee is “a practical
one” because “[f]ormal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to
the duties an employee actually is expected to perform.”305
[92] Finally, the majority opinion ends with a discussion of academic
freedom, emphasizing that its decision does not apply to cases involving
speech related to scholarship or teaching.306 The Court remarked that
expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction may
implicate “additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted
for by [the] Court’s customary public employee-speech jurisprudence.”307
The Court declined to decide whether the analysis would apply in the
same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching.308
303

Id.

304

Id.

305

Id. at 424-25.

306

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.

307

Id.

308

Id. Lower courts have struggled as to whether this dictum applies to K-12 teacher
speech or whether this exception applies solely to professor speech at the university level.
See SCHNEIDER, supra note 28, § 2.20 at n.138.74. One significant difference between
teachers and university professors is that professors are expected to produce independent
scholarship that no reasonable person would impute to the university itself. See
Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 207-08 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi, J., dissenting)
(concluding that Garcetti, properly understood, rests on a government speech rationale);
see also infra Part IV.C for a further discussion of the government speech doctrine.
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B. Another Possible Framework for Regulating Teachers’ OffCampus Speech to Students Using Social Media: Treating
Teachers’ Speech as School-Sponsored Speech
[93] A few courts have regulated on-campus teacher speech under
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,309 but this framework would
apply only in extremely limited circumstances with respect to teachers’
off-campus speech.310 Hazelwood would apply to teacher-student speech
using social media only if Garcetti does not. Thus, if a teacher speaks
pursuant to her official duties, Garcetti provides the proper test.311
However, assuming that a teacher does not speak pursuant to her official
duties, Hazelwood would govern if, first, one could reasonably perceive
the teacher’s speech as the school’s speech and, second, one could
reasonably characterize the teacher-student interaction as a supervised
learning experience.312
[94]

In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court held that school administrators

309

484 U.S. 260 (1988); see, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1994); Kramer v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 715 F. Supp.
2d 335, 353-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that there is disagreement among the federal
courts of appeals on whether teacher classroom speech should be analyzed under Garcetti
or Hazelwood; the court analyzed the issue under both tests). According to Kramer, the
Second Circuit is among the courts that have extended the Supreme Court's standard for
student speech to teachers' instructional speech. 715 F. Supp. 2d at 354. But see
Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 198 (determining that a grievance filed by a teacher was
unprotected speech pursuant to Garcetti without considering the relevance of the
teacher’s position as an educator under Hazelwood). Most of the cases applying
Hazelwood to teachers’ instructional speech were decided pre-Garcetti. See, e.g., Ward
v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir.1993).
310

Some courts have concluded that Hazelwood does not apply to off-campus student
speech. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 937 (3d
Cir. 2011) (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-01 (2007)).
311

See 547 U.S. at 424.

312

See 484 U.S. at 271.
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could regulate student speech if one could reasonably interpret the speech
as the school’s speech and the school has a legitimate pedagogical reason
for regulating the speech.313 The Court reasoned that this standard is
consistent with the Court’s “oft-expressed view that the education of the
[n]ation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and
state and local officials, and not of federal judges.”314
[95] The Court concluded that educators may exercise control over the
contents of a high school newspaper that is produced as part of the
school’s journalism curriculum,315 “so long as [the official’s] actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”316 In this case, the
school principal objected to two articles scheduled to appear in a school
newspaper.317 One article “described three Hazelwood East students’
experiences with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on
students at the school.”318 The school’s journalism students wrote and
313

Id. at 273. The speech in Hazelwood can be interpreted in two ways: as school speech
under the government speech doctrine, discussed infra Part IV.C, or as student speech
within a nonpublic forum. See id. at 276, 270. The crucial distinction between these
competing interpretations is that there is no requirement of viewpoint neutrality under the
former; the only requirement is the reasonableness standard the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments impose on all government action. See id. at 267, 270, 273. Under the
nonpublic forum rationale, the perception that the speech could be interpreted as the
school’s speech is relevant because this perception provides the school with a rational
basis for censoring the newspaper. In short, it is reasonable for a school to want to
dissociate itself from speech of which it disapproves. See id. at 266-67, 269-73.
314

Id. at 273.

315

Id. at 260-61.

316

Id. at 273. The Court concluded that the faculty-supervised student newspaper was a
nonpublic forum. Id. at 269-70. With respect to nonpublic forums, the school can
regulate speech within the forum subject to the rational basis test; regulations supported
by legitimate pedagogical reasons do not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 273.
317

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263.

318

Id. at 263.
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edited the newspaper under the supervision of faculty, and the Board of
Education provided some of the newspaper’s funding.319
[96] The principal was concerned with, among other things, privacy
issues, because, although the article used pseudonyms for the girls
involved, the pregnant students might be identifiable from the story.320 He
also was worried that “references to sexual activity and birth control were
inappropriate for some . . . students at the school.”321
[97] The Supreme Court held that since the newspaper was a supervised
learning experience provided by the school, school officials were entitled
to regulate the contents of the newspaper in any reasonable manner.322 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the distinction between requiring
a school to tolerate particular student speech and requiring a school to
affirmatively promote particular student speech.323 Ultimately, the Court
held that school-sponsored publications that “students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school” can be regulated as long as the school official has a
legitimate pedagogical reason for doing so.324 The Court defined schoolsponsored activities as those that may “be characterized as part of the
school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom
setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to
impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and
audiences.”325
319

Id. at 262-63.

320

Id. at 263.

321

Id.

322

Hazelwood, 484 U.S at 271, 273.

323

Id. at 270-71.

324

Id. at 271, 273.

325

Id. at 271.
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[98] The Court emphasized that educators are entitled to exercise
greater control over school-sponsored speech “to assure that participants
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their
level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school.”326 Schools need to “retain the
authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or [other
such] conduct.”327
C. The Government Speech Doctrine: Garcetti and Hazelwood
in a Different Light
[99] The government speech doctrine is intertwined with both the
public employee and school-sponsored speech frameworks. Some
commentators contend that the government speech doctrine best explains
both Garcetti and Hazelwood.328
[100] In essence, the government speech doctrine provides that the First
Amendment’s free speech clause restricts government regulation of
private speech, but does not restrict the government’s speech.329 Under
326

Id.

327

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272. Courts of Appeals are split as to whether Hazelwood
allows viewpoint based restrictions on student speech. See Nicholas J. Wagoner, Does
the 1st Amendment Permit Viewpoint Based Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech?,
CIRCUIT SPLITS (Jan. 30, 2012, 5:19 AM), http://www.circuitsplits.com/student-speech/.
Whether viewpoint restrictions on student speech are allowed may depend on whether
Hazelwood is best explained as a government speech case or a nonpublic forum decision.
See Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 631-33 (2d Cir.
2005).
328

See, e.g., Nicole B. Cásarez, The Student Press, The Public Workplace, and
Expanding Notions of Government Speech, 35 J.C. & U.L. 1, 7, 17-19 (2008).
329

See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009); Nat’l
Endowment of Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the
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this recent doctrine,330 the Court has held that a city’s selection of a
permanent monument for a public park constitutes government speech and
is therefore not curtailed by the First Amendment’s free speech clause.331
Even though a private organization donated the monument, the speech was
government speech because the city “‘effectively controlled’ the messages
sent by the monuments in the Park by exercising ‘final approval authority’
over their selection” and by taking ownership of most of the permanent
monuments.332 In the words of Justice Souter, the city’s selection of a
permanent monument was government speech because a “reasonable and
fully informed observer would understand the expression to be
government speech.”333
[101] Both Hazelwood and Garcetti can be interpreted as “government
speech” cases, though Garcetti fits less readily within this framework.
Although Hazelwood predates the government speech doctrine, the
Court’s conclusion in Hazelwood that educators can regulate schoolsponsored publications that might be perceived to “bear the imprimatur of
the school”334 fits readily within the government speech doctrine since, in
these circumstances, the school effectively controls the message. On the
very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view . . . .”); see also
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553, 562, 565-67 (2005) (holding that
generic advertising funded by assessments on beef producers was “government speech,”
and therefore not restricted by the First Amendment); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 174
(1991). Of course, the Establishment Clause, Equal Protection Clause and, ultimately,
the electoral process do restrict government speech. Cf. Pleasant Grove City, Utah, 555
U.S. at 468-69; id. at 482 (Stevens, J., concurring).
330

The Court first explicitly referred to the “government speech doctrine” in Pleasant
Grove City, Utah, 555 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring).
331

Id. at 467-68, 470.

332

Id. at 473.

333

Id. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring).

334

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988).
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other hand, despite the Court’s mention, at least implicitly, of the
government speech doctrine within Garcetti itself, Garcetti fits less easily
within this framework.335
The Court in Garcetti reasoned that
“[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”336 “It simply reflects the
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created.”337 Thus, at least implicitly, the Court
acknowledged the application of the government speech doctrine.338
[102] However, the government speech doctrine is not an entirely
convincing explanation for Garcetti. Presumably, Ceballos was hired to
exercise independent judgment in his disposition memoranda339 and his
speech was not speech that a reasonable and fully informed person would
understand to be government speech, particularly because his speech was
not made outside the workplace. However, if the government speech
doctrine includes any speech that a public employee is required to produce
within the scope of his employment, as was the case with Ceballos’ speech
in Garcetti, then Garcetti is consistent with this doctrine.340 Under this
335

Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 635 (arguing that Garcetti is better interpreted as a
public employee work performance case).
336

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006).

337

Id. at 422.

338

See id.

339

Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 635 (arguing that Garcetti is better interpreted as a
public employee work performance case); see also Mark Strasser, Ignore the Man Behind
the Curtain: On the Government Speech Doctrine and What it Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 85, 107 (2011) (concluding that “the Court did not need to invoke the
government speech doctrine to decide [Garcetti]”).
340

See Strasser, supra note 339 (noting that the Court, in Garcetti, implicitly adopted the
theory that “any statement made within the scope of public employment is (or should be
treated as) the government’s own speech”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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interpretation, the fact that Ceballos was expected to exercise independent
judgment is immaterial because his work product bears the imprimatur of
his office and the public will perceive his speech as the speech of his
office.
D. Similar Yet Different: The Framework for Evaluating
Student Off-Campus Speech, an Analogous Area of Law
[103] At one point, teachers’ and students’ free speech rights were
roughly comparable.341 Currently, students’ off-campus free speech rights
exceed their teachers’ off-campus free speech rights.342 Although teachers
and students are not similarly situated with respect to the First
Amendment and therefore need not receive equivalent speech protection,
the disparate development of these areas of law is concerning.
[104] Despite a number of opportunities to do so, the Supreme Court has
not yet heard a student First Amendment free speech case when the speech
arises beyond the “schoolhouse gates.” Lower courts that have addressed
341

At least when teachers were “off-duty,” teacher speech rights were roughly
comparable to student speech rights. Compare Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
571-74 (1968) (teacher speech protected when the speech implicates a public concern and
the school’s interests in prohibiting the speech do not outweigh the speaker’s interests in
speaking) with Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)
(student speech protected when the speech is political and the speech will not result or
foreseeably result in a material or substantial disruption to the school environment).
Alternatively, because the Supreme Court did not explicitly require that a teacher’s
speech implicate a public concern in Pickering nor explicitly require that a student’s
speech be political in Tinker, teacher and student rights were, at least arguably,
comparable in a different way. Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-74 (teacher speech
protected when the school’s interests in prohibiting the speech do not outweigh the
speaker’s interests in speaking) with Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (student speech protected
when the speech will not result or foreseeably result in a material or substantial disruption
to the school environment).
342

See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926-27 (3d
Cir. 2011) (holding that a student’s off-campus speech deserves greater protection than
“speech that a reasonable observer would view as the school’s own speech”).
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this issue typically allow schools to regulate off-campus student speech
under Tinker if the speech arrives on campus.343 Despite the divergence in
protection provided to off-campus teacher and student speech in recent
years, Tinker remains an influential framework for analyzing teacher-tostudent off-campus speech.
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District
[105] Under the Court’s decision in Tinker, a student’s political speech
may be regulated only if the speech is potentially or actually disruptive to
the school environment.344 In essence, students have the right to express
their opinions as long as the expression does not “materially and
substantially” disrupt school activities.345
[106] In Tinker, the Court sought to balance the free speech rights of
students with the need for school officials to maintain control over the
school environment.346 The plaintiffs in Tinker, three high school
343

See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that
Tinker is the appropriate standard for evaluating a student threat made off-campus); J.C.
ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (observing that “the majority of courts will apply Tinker where speech originating
off campus is brought to school or to the attention of school authorities, whether by the
author himself or some other means”); J.S. ex rel. Synder, 650 F.3d at 926 (assuming
without deciding that Tinker was the appropriate standard); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527
F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that the Tinker standard was not met, but leaving
open whether a stricter standard might apply; the extent of this holding is unclear because
the case involved both on-campus and off-campus student speech). But see J.S. ex rel.
Synder, 650 F.3d at 937-39 (observing that lower courts are divided on whether Tinker’s
substantial disruption test applies to off-campus speech; five concurring justices would
have provided full First Amendment free speech rights to the student’s off-campus
speech).
344

See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.

345

Id.

346

See id. at 507, 509.
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students, were suspended for wearing black armbands to school in protest
of the Vietnam War.347 The Court noted that First Amendment rights are
available to teachers and students and that “[n]either students [n]or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.”348 However, the Court also emphasized that
local school officials must have the ability to “prescribe and control
conduct in the schools.”349 Because the speech in Tinker was “a silent,
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or
disturbance,” school officials could not prohibit the speech.350
[107] The Court reasoned that personal expression of opinion, even on
controversial matters, cannot be prohibited unless the speech “‘materially
and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school’” or “collid[es] with the rights” of
other students.351 The school, however, does not have to wait until a
disruption occurs before acting: if facts are present “which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of
or material interference with school activities,” the school may ban the
speech.352
[108] The Court distinguished between a reasonable forecast of
substantial disruption and an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance” in some depth.353 It acknowledged that any statement that
347

Id. at 504.

348

Id. at 506.

349

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.

350

Id. at 508.

351

Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).

352

See id. at 514.

353

Id. at 508.
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was different from the viewpoint of another student might cause an
argument or disturbance, but that under our Constitution, schools “must
take this risk,”354 because “this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of
openness—is the basis of our national strength and of the independence
and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively
permissive, often disputatious, society.”355 A school official must be able
to show that his or her action to prohibit an expression of opinion “was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”356 In
Tinker, the authorities appeared to have been motivated by a wish to avoid
the controversy surrounding opposition to the war.357 The Court also
noted that this particular symbol seemed to have been singled out for
prohibition.358 Consequently, the prohibition of expression of one
particular opinion, at least without evidence of material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally
permissible.359
[109] In Tinker, some disruption to school activities did occur, but it was
insufficient to justify banning the student speech.360 The Court found that
354

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.

355

Id. at 508-09.

356

Id. at 509.

357

Id. at 510.

358

Id. at 510-11.

359

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11.

360

Id. at 514. According to Justice Black’s dissenting opinion, while the record did not
demonstrate that the students wearing the armbands shouted, used profane language, or
were violent, testimony supported the conclusion that their armbands caused comments,
warnings by other students, the poking of fun at them, and a warning by an older football
player that other, non-protesting students had better leave them alone. Id. at 517 (Black,
J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Black noted that there was “evidence that a teacher of
mathematics had his lesson period practically wrecked” by disputes with one of the
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the wearing of the armbands precipitated “discussion outside of the
classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder.”361 Although
outside the classroom some hostile remarks were directed to the students
wearing the armbands, “there were no threats or acts of violence on school
premises.”362 This was not a “material” or “substantial” disruption and
thus, the school erred in prohibiting the armbands.363
[110] Furthermore, Tinker placed the burden of justifying the prohibition
of a particular expression of opinion on school authorities.364 With respect
to the nation’s school systems, the Court noted that public schools “may
not be enclaves of totalitarianism.”365 The Court reasoned that the
classroom is a microcosm of the “‘marketplace of ideas,’”366 and that
“[t]he Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude
of tongues.’”367 Importantly, the principle of student speech cases “is not
confined to the supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in
the classroom.”368 “When [the student] is in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may
express his opinions, even on controversial subjects . . . .”369 However,
students wearing an armband. Id. at 517-18. Justice Black concluded that the armbands
did take “the students’ minds off their classwork.” Id. at 518.
361

Id. at 514.

362

Id. at 508.

363

Id. at 509.

364

See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509-10.

365

Id. at 511.

366

Id. at 512.

367

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

368

Id.
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the First Amendment does not protect conduct by the student, “in class or
out of it,”370 “which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork.”371 The Court did not
“confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a
telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to a supervised and
ordained discussion in a school classroom.”372
2. Recent Court of Appeals Student Off-Campus
Speech Cases
[111] As previously noted, the Supreme Court has not yet heard a student
First Amendment free speech case where the speech arises beyond the
“schoolhouse gates.” The Courts of Appeals’ decisions regarding the
parameters of public school students’ off-campus speech demonstrate that
this area of law is still in flux.373
[112] The Fourth Circuit374 and most likely the Second Circuit375 employ
369

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13.

370

There has been some confusion among the lower courts as to whether the phrase “or
out of [the classroom]” means speech occurring on school premises or whether it extends
to students’ off-campus speech. See J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 915, 938 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011).
371

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.

372

Id.

373

The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate the divide between teacher and
student free speech rights with respect to speech off-campus. At present, the most
restrictive test courts use to evaluate student off-campus speech is Tinker. See, e.g.,
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that Tinker is the
appropriate standard for evaluating off-campus student speech). Wisniewski involved a
student threat against his teacher. Id.
374

See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011).

375

Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39. The two leading Second Circuit decisions are not
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a two-tier approach to resolving speech issues arising from student offcampus speech. Under this framework, the court first determines whether
the student speech will foreseeably arrive on campus.376 If so, school
officials can regulate the speech under Tinker, which allows school
officials to regulate speech if the speech causes an actual disruption to
school activities or if it will foreseeably disrupt school activities.377
[113] The Third Circuit may employ a different framework, although the
framework is difficult to discern from one of its recent decisions involving
student off-campus speech.378 This recent en banc decision held that the
student speech was protected under the First Amendment.379
[114] The Third Circuit’s decision in J.S. ex rel. Snyder (J.S.) is
puzzling, as the court applied the Tinker test to student speech despite
refusing to decide whether Tinker was the proper standard.380 Ultimately,
directly on point. In Wisniewski, the student speech involved threats of violence against
one of his teachers. Id. In Doninger, part of the plaintiff’s speech, her original email
which was later republished by her off-campus, was composed and sent from campus.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008). Furthermore, the district court
found that although created off-campus, the speech “was purposefully designed by [the
student] to come onto the campus.” Id. at 50. The Second Circuit also emphasized that
the student’s punishment was limited; she was not allowed to participate in the school’s
student government. Id. at 46. Ultimately, the Second Circuit concluded that the school
administrators were entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s free speech claim
because the law governing off-campus student speech was difficult for school
administrators to discern. See id. at 54. Thus, the court did not resolve the underlying
constitutional issues.
376

See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40-41; Doninger, 527 F.3d at
48.
377

See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-40; Doninger, 527 F.3d at
48.
378

See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).

379

See id. at 930-33.

380

Id. at 926.
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the Third Circuit held that the Tinker test was not met, and, therefore, the
school could not regulate the student’s speech.381 In J.S., the student’s
speech occurred off-campus and was brought onto campus only at the
principal’s request.382 The student’s MySpace profile targeted her
principal, insulting the principal and his family, and accusing him of
sexual misconduct with students.383 The six dissenting judges, and
presumably, the five judges not joining in the concurring opinion, would
have evaluated the student speech under Tinker.384 Of course, the majority
and dissent disagreed as to how Tinker applied.385
[115] By contrast, five judges in a separate concurrence concluded that
Tinker does not apply to student off-campus speech and that student offcampus speech should enjoy the same protections enjoyed by citizens in
381

Id. at 928-31.

382

Id. at 921.

383

J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920-21. The majority concluded that the student’s
profile of her principal was “so outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously, and
no one did.” Id. at 930. The dissent disagreed with this conclusion. See id. at 947-48
(Fisher, J., dissenting).
384

Id. at 941.

385

The dissent focused extensively on the pernicious effects this type of speech may have
on educators. Id. at 946-47 (quoting Jina S. Yoon, Teacher Characteristics as Predictors
of Teacher-Student Relationships: Stress, Negative Effect, and Self-Efficacy, 30 SOC.
BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 485, 491 (2002) (“‘Not only does teacher stress affect teachers'
general attitude toward teaching, but also it is likely to influence the quality of their
relationships with students’”); Suzanne Tochterman & Fred Barnes, Sexual Harassment
in the Classroom: Teachers as Targets, 7 RECLAIMING CHILD & YOUTH 21, 22 (1998)
(“noting that educators who are subject to sexual harassment feel “‘detachment; shame;
horror; uncertainty; demoralization; fear; feelings of being unappreciated, targeted,
objectified, belittled, and victimized; sadness; anger; avoidance; feeling defeated; blame;
separation; and attack’”)). Furthermore, the dissent observed that “[e]ducators become
anxious and depressed and feel unable to relate to their students” and lose their
motivation to teach; their students suffer as a result. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 94647.
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the community at large.386 Importantly, the court noted that this case did
not involve political speech.387 However, the concurring justices
concluded that the speech was nonetheless protected because there is no
First Amendment exception for offensive speech that lacks social value.388
V. TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS
USING SOCIAL MEDIA: RECENT CASES
[116] Currently, there are few reported decisions examining a teacher’s
rights with respect to off-campus speech using social media.389 The two
386

J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 936.

387

Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring). Furthermore, according to the concurring opinion,
the speech need not be political for First Amendment purposes. Id. The speech in J.S.
was merely insulting. Id.
388

Id. at 939 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219-20 (2011)).

389

Many of these disputes are not litigated or settle privately before a verdict. See
Teacher Fired for Ripping Students, Blames Facebook, CBS NEW YORK (Aug. 20, 2010,
11:23 PM),
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2010/08/20/teacher-fired-for-ripping-students-blames-faceb
ook/ (firing teacher for writing on her Facebook that “[t]he town is so arrogant and
snobby,” and that she was “so not looking forward to another year at Cohasset schools.”);
see also Fulmer, supra note 10, at ¶ 31 (citing Mario Roldan, Another CMS Teacher
Faces Termination over Facebook Post, WCNC.COM (Nov. 1, 2009, 6:06 PM),
http://www.wcnc.com/news/local/68701507.html) (“At least four teachers, of CharlotteMecklenburg Schools have faced disciplinary action due to their social networking
website activity.”); see also id. (quoting Roldan, supra) (dismissing teacher for
describing her workplace on Facebook as “the most ghetto school in Charlotte”); see also
Michael May, Hoover: Caught in the Flash, AUSTIN CHRONICLE, June 23, 2006,
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2006-06-23/378611/ (firing art teacher because her
partner posted non-erotic, partially nude pictures of her photography webpage). Other
cases have been decided on alternate grounds. In Rubino v. City of New York, No.
107292/11, 2012 WL 373101, at *6-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. 1, 2012), the trial court held
that the termination of the teacher was disproportionate to the teacher’s speech. In
reaching this decision, the court did not address the teacher’s First Amendment claim,
noting that New York law prohibited the court’s reexamination of the hearing officer’s
conclusion the claim had no merit. See id. at *5 (noting that a hearing officer’s errors of
law and fact are not, except in extraordinary circumstances, reviewable). In this case, the
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leading district court decisions, however, were both decided in favor of
school authorities.390
A. Spanierman v. Hughes
[117] In Spanierman, the court concluded that Garcetti did not apply
because the teacher was not speaking pursuant to his official duties and
responsibilities as a teacher.391 Notably, the court observed that the
teacher was not acting pursuant to his responsibilities as a teacher because
speech was not made directly to her students, but posted to other adults on the teacher’s
Facebook page. See id. at *1. While the court described her reference to a child’s death
as “repulsive,” the court held that her termination was disproportionate to her speech.
See id. at *7-8. The teacher, one day after a New York City school student drowned
during a school field trip, posted on her Facebook page that she was “thinking the beach
sounds like a wonderful idea for my 5th graders! I HATE THEIR GUTS! They are the
devils [sic] spawn.” Id. at *1. In response to another poster’s comments asking whether
she would save a particular student, the teacher responded, “Yes, I wld [sic] not throw a
life jacket in for a million!!” Id. A number of cases have been tried before
administrative law judges. See Emil Protalinski, Teacher Should be Fired for Facebook
Comment, Judge Rules, ZDNET (Nov. 15, 2011, 6:20 AM PST),
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/teacher-should-be-fired-for-facebook-comment-jud
ge-rules/5375 (concluding that a New Jersey teacher who posted on Facebook that she
was “not a teacher [but] a warden for future criminals” should be terminated). Other
cases may be tried shortly. See ‘It's a Perverted Sin and Breeds Like Cancer’: High
School Teacher Faces Sack Over Anti-Gay Facebook Comments, MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 13,
2012, 6:31 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2086043/Viki-Knox-NJ-teachers-anti-gay-Faceb
ook-comments-Its-sin-breeds-like-cancer.html (termination proceedings have been
started against a New Jersey teacher based on an anti-gay diatribe she posted on
Facebook); see also Jonathan Turley, Beaver Damned: Wisconsin Teacher Suspended
For Picture on Facebook, JONATHAN TURLEY (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://jonathanturley.org/2009/02/09/beaver-damned-wisconsin-teacher-suspended-for-pi
cture-on-facebook/ (teacher placed on leave as a result of her posting a Facebook picture
showing her aiming a shotgun at the viewer).
390

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); see also Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F.
Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008).
391

Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
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he was under no “obligation to make the statements he made on
MySpace.”392 In addition, the court did not use Hazelwood’s framework
to analyze the speech, presumably because the teacher’s speech could not
reasonably be perceived as the school’s speech. Also, the court did not
discuss any off-campus student speech decisions. Instead, the court
analyzed the speech under the Pickering-Connick framework, ultimately
granting summary judgment to the defendants.393
[118] The speech in Spanierman was extreme.394 Jeffrey Spanierman, a
Connecticut public high school English teacher, used MySpace, a social
media website, to communicate with his students.395 Spanierman
“testified that he used his MySpace account to communicate with students
about homework, to learn more about the students so he could relate to
them better, and to conduct casual, non-school related discussions [with
students].”396 However, his MySpace account contained pictures of naked
men with “inappropriate comments” underneath.397 Some students
complained about Spanierman’s MySpace page to school personnel.398 A
guidance counselor learned of Spanierman’s account, viewed the account,
and confronted Spanierman about it.399 The counselor suggested that
Spanierman use only “the school email system for the purpose of
educational topics and homework.”400 Furthermore, the school guidance
392

Id.

393

See id. at 309, 313.

394

See id. at 297-98.

395

Id.

396

Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 297-98.

397

Id. at 298.

398

Id. at 313.

399

Id. at 298.
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counselor testified that the account would “be disruptive to students.”401
[119] Following his meeting with the school guidance counselor,
Spanierman deleted his account, but then set up a nearly identical account
on MySpace with the same people as friends.402 Spanierman was not
rehired.403
[120] Spanierman sued, alleging among other claims that the school
administration had violated his First Amendment free speech rights.404
The district court held that even if the plaintiff’s speech involved a matter
of public concern under Pickering-Connick, the plaintiff’s claim still
failed.405
[121] The district court explained that Garcetti did not apply because its
holding is limited to the expressions an employee makes pursuant to the
employee’s official responsibilities rather than to statements or complaints
made outside the duties of employment.406 Despite the plaintiff’s
testimony that he used his MySpace account to communicate with his
students about homework and to learn more about the students so he could
relate to them better, the district court concluded that Garcetti was
inapplicable, noting that no evidence in the record supported the notion
that Spanierman was under any obligation to make the statements he made

400

Id.

401

Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 298.

402

Id.

403

Id. at 299.

404

Id.

405

Id. at 314.

406

See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
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on MySpace.407 The district court noted that public employees who make
public statements outside the course of performing their official duties
retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the
kind of activity engaged in by citizens who are not government
employees.408
[122] The district court employed the Pickering-Connick framework to
analyze Spanierman’s speech, first examining whether Spanierman’s
speech might relate to a “public concern.”409 The court stretched to find
some part of the teacher’s web page that implicated a public concern.410
The contents of Spanierman’s MySpace page were varied; the profile
contained comments from the teacher to other MySpace users, comments
from other users to the teacher, and pictures, blogs, and poetry.411 Even
though the court found that almost none of the contents on the plaintiff’s
407

Id. at 298, 309. Currently, the Second Circuit employs a different test for determining
whether an employee’s speech is made “pursuant to his official duties.” See Weintraub v.
Bd. of Ed., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010). This test is two-pronged: (1) whether the
speech is “in furtherance of” an employee’s “core duties,” and (2) whether there is a
relevant “citizen analogue” to the employee’s speech. Id. at 198. Judge Calabresi, in
dissent, proposed a narrower rule: “an employee’s speech is ‘pursuant to official duties’
when the employee is required to make such speech in the course of fulfilling his job
duties.” Id. at 208 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). In short, the employer must in some way
rely on the employee’s speech, as is the case where the speech is an official
communication or is used by the employer to promote the employer’s mission. See id.
Even under the majority’s broader test, Spanierman’s speech would not qualify as speech
made pursuant to his official duties: his speech was not in furtherance of any core duty,
and citizen analogues existed. Off-campus teacher-to-student social media speech should
not be regulated under Garcetti regardless of the precise contours of Garcetti’s reach.
See infra Part VI.A.
408

Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423
(2006)).
409

Id.

410

See id. at 310-11.

411

Id. at 310.
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profile page touched on matters of public concern, the court concluded
that one of the plaintiff’s poems, if all ambiguities were construed in the
plaintiff’s favor, might implicate a matter of public concern.412 However,
the district court ultimately held that there was no causal connection
between the plaintiff’s poem and the school’s decision not to rehire the
plaintiff.413
[123] Furthermore, even if the plaintiff could establish a causal
connection between the poem and his discharge, the defendants would still
prevail because the plaintiff’s claim failed the Pickering balancing test.414
In essence, the defendants had provided sufficient evidence that the
plaintiff’s conduct on MySpace, as a whole, disrupted school activities.415
In particular, Spanierman’s discussion on MySpace “with a student about
‘getting any’ (presumably sex) or a threat made to a student (albeit a
facetious one) about detention” supported the district court’s conclusion
that school administrators could have reasonably surmised that
Spanierman’s MySpace conduct was disruptive to school activities.416
[124] Spanierman’s speech involved egregious, repeated conduct.417
Therefore, the opinion provides little guidance as to how courts would
treat less extreme conduct. Given the sexual overtones and the disruptive
effect the speech had on school activities, this was not a difficult case.

412

Id. at 310-11.

413

Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 311-12.

414

See id. at 311-12.

415

See id. at 312.

416

Id.

417

See id. at 298.
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B. Snyder v. Millersville University
[125] Millersville University denied Stacey Snyder an education degree
because she had not successfully completed her student-teaching
experience at a local high school.418
In response to Snyder’s
“unprofessional” speech on MySpace, the local high school had barred
Snyder from campus.419 Thus, she could not complete her student-teacher
practicum and based on this deficiency, Millersville University did not
award her an education degree.420
[126] The dispositive inquiry was whether Snyder’s role was that of a
teacher or student.421 Ultimately, the district court found that her role as a
student-teacher was similar to that of a public employee rather than a
student.422 Consequently, the court applied public employee speech law
rather than student speech law.423
[127] Snyder experienced some difficulties during her student-teaching
placement.424 According to evaluations from both her university professor
and her supervising teacher, Snyder had issues regarding her competence
and her over-familiarity with students.425 In particular, “on several
418

Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3,
2008).
419

Id.

420

Id.

421

See id. at *10, *15. Presumably, if the court had concluded Snyder was a student, her
comments would have been protected speech. See id. at *14.
422

Id. at *15.

423

See Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *14.

424

Id. at *4.

425

Id. at *3-4.
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occasions, she informed students during class that she had a MySpace
webpage.”426
[128] In part, Snyder’s difficulties stemmed from two MySpace
postings.427 The first referenced Snyder’s supervising teacher somewhat
obliquely, referring to her as “the problem.”428
[A friend of Snyder’s] said that one of my students was on
here looking at my page, which is fine. I have nothing to
hide. I am over 21, and I don’t say anything that will hurt
me (in the long run). Plus, I don’t think they will stoop so
low as to mess with my future. So, bring on the love! I
figure a couple of students will actually send me a message
when I am no longer their official teacher. They keep
asking me why I won’t apply there. Do you think it would
hurt me to tell them the real reason (or who the problem
was)?429
[129] The other posting was a photograph of Snyder wearing a pirate hat
and holding a plastic cup containing a mixed beverage with a caption
reading “drunken pirate.”430 The supervising teacher, although she did
object to the posting of the photograph, was more upset about the text
referring to the supervisor as “the problem.”431 The supervising teacher
concluded that Snyder had acted unprofessionally in criticizing the
426

Id. at *5.

427

Id. at *5-6.

428

See Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5-6.

429

Id. at *5.

430

Id. at *6.

431

See id. at *7.
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supervisor on her web page.432
[130] The plaintiff conceded that her postings involved only personal
matters rather than any matter of public concern.433 Given PickeringConnick’s requirement that public employee speech must implicate a
public concern in order to be protected, Snyder’s concession that her
speech was “personal” made this a relatively easy case.434 Unsurprisingly,
the court returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.435
VI. IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES, PICKERING-CONNICK IS THE
APPLICABLE TEST FOR EVALUATING WHETHER SCHOOLS CAN
RESTRICT TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING
SOCIAL MEDIA
A. Garcetti Will Rarely Apply to Teachers’ Off-Campus
Speech to Students Using Social Media
[131] Except in extraordinary circumstances, the holding in Garcetti,
excluding First Amendment free speech protection for public employee
speech made “pursuant to [the employee’s] official duties,” is not
applicable to teacher-to-student off-campus speech using social media.436
432

Id. at *8.

433

Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *16.

434

See id. at *14, *16. But what if her comments could have been construed as a critique
of the teacher-training process? What if the picture of her with alcohol could be been
interpreted as a warning not to drink alcohol? Even if the message regarding her
supervisor and the picture of her drinking did not implicate matters of public concern,
what if her MySpace page included other matters of public concern? In short, some
creative lawyering may have made this a far more difficult case for the court.
435

See id. at *16.

436

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424-25 (2006). These extraordinary
circumstances would include situations in which the social media usage was part of the
school curriculum. In this case, school officials could regulate its use. See id. at 423-25.
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Even though some teachers’ communications with students using social
media might foreseeably involve instruction and guidance, thus arguably
falling within a teacher’s “official duties,” Garcetti should be interpreted
in its proper context and not be extended to limit this speech.437
In addition, schools could likely regulate teachers’ communications with students using
social media during working hours or using school equipment. See id.
437

Garcetti has been criticized on many fronts. See Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 636.
Some commentators have argued that the Garcetti holding should apply only to a public
employee’s “required” speech. See Weintraub v. Bd. of Ed., 593 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir.
2010) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (proposing that an employee’s speech is “pursuant to
official duties” when the employee is required to make such speech in the course of
fulfilling his job duties); see also Bauries & Schach, supra note 218, at 372 (concluding
that an employee’s speech made “pursuant to official duties" means speech an employee
could be punished for if she refused to speak, rather than speech “related to” her
employment or made “in the course” of her employment). Another commentator has
concluded that “pursuant to official duties” should encompass all aspects of a public
employee’s job performance. See Roosevelt III, supra, at 646. Yet another concluded
that an employee’s speech is pursuant to her official duties if the speech is generally
consistent with the type of activities the employee is paid to perform. See Wenkart,
supra note 127, at 6. While the outer reaches of Garcetti are uncertain, lower courts have
not limited Garcetti’s application to a public employee’s required speech. See, e.g.,
Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 198 (holding that a teacher’s complaint concerning classroom
discipline was made pursuant to his official duties). Lower courts have considered a
number of non-exhaustive factors to determine if the speech was made pursuant to an
employee’s official job responsibilities: whether the employee was required or paid to
produce the speech, whether the speech was made within the chain of command, whether
it was made at the workplace, whether it could be perceived as the employer’s speech,
whether it derived from special knowledge acquired by the employee in the course of her
employment, and whether there is a citizen-analogue to the speech. See, e.g., Decotiis v.
Whittmore, 635 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). Regardless of the outer limits of Garcetti,
Garcetti likely applies only if some of the speech is made during working hours or using
workplace equipment. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. Furthermore, a government entity
can likely restrict speech under Garcetti if the speech sufficiently distracts the employee,
her co-workers, or her superiors from performing official job responsibilities. See
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-53 (1983). But see Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub.
Sch. Bd. of Ed., 595 F.3d 1126, 1135 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the test for
whether a teacher’s speech is made pursuant to her official job duties is whether the
speech was “commissioned” by the employer, not whether the speech was made during
the employee’s working hours or whether it concerned the subject matter of the person’s
employment). Presumably, though, one factor in determining whether the speech was
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[132] Garcetti and Connick both involved a dispute arising during
working hours and relating to the employee’s work responsibilities.438
Even though these cases involve both of these factors, it is unclear
whether both factors are necessary to establish that the plaintiff acted
pursuant to his official duties. However, most off-campus teacher-tostudent speech will likely involve neither of these factors.
[133] In essence, Garcetti concerned a public employee’s job
performance.439 Crucially, the speech in Garcetti occurred at the
workplace during working hours and involved the use of the employer’s
workplace, presumably including its technology and materials, to create
the speech.440 The Court reasoned that when the plaintiff in the case,
“commissioned” by the employer would be whether the employee’s speech is created
during working hours or using workplace equipment. While the outer reaches of Garcetti
are unclear, Garcetti provides no basis for limiting teacher off-campus speech using
social media under any of these interpretations.
438

In particular, the speech in these cases resulted from the claimant’s dissatisfaction
with working conditions or the work process itself. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413-15
(Ceballos expressed his concern that the documents submitted to support a search warrant
were inaccurate); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41 (noting that her questionnaire
solicited coworkers views regarding “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a
grievance committee, the level of confidence in her supervisors, and whether employees
felt pressured to work in political campaigns”).
439

See Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 633.

440

See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420. Both of these factors may not be required to establish
that a plaintiff acted pursuant to his “official duties.” However, Garcetti and Connick
involved both factors. As previously noted, lower courts have considered a number of
non-exhaustive factors to determine if the speech was made pursuant to an employee’s
official job responsibilities. See, e.g., Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 32. The more the employee’s
role requires confidentiality, policymaking or public contact, the greater the employer’s
interest in regulating the speech. Christopher B. McLaughlin, The Intersection of the
First Amendment and Professional Ethics for Government Attorneys, U.N.C. SCH. GOV’T
1, 10, available at
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/Microsoft%20Word%20%20manuscript_mclaughlin_workplace_and_constitution_0.pdf (citing Sheppard v.
Beerman, 190 F. Supp. 2d 361, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).

80

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIX, Issue 2

Ceballos, “went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform,”
he acted pursuant to his official duties as opposed to acting as a citizen.441
In addition, he did not act as a citizen when he went about conducting his
daily professional activities, such as supervising attorneys, investigating
charges, and preparing filings.442 Nor did he speak as a citizen when he
wrote a memorandum addressing the disposition of a pending criminal
case.443 In short, Ceballos’ speech resulted from an investigation he
conducted during working hours, presumably using workplace technology
and materials, resulting in a confrontation with his supervisor at his
workplace during working hours. As the Court reasoned, there is no
citizen analogue for speech like Ceballos’ because his speech arose within
the context of his required job responsibilities.444
[134] However, when a teacher’s speech is made off-campus and without
the use of any workplace technology or equipment, the Garcetti holding
should not apply because under these conditions, a teacher’s speech is not
made pursuant to the teacher’s “official duties.” Garcetti should not be
applied even if the speech involves homework help or some other form of
guidance and thus falls within the outer stretches of “official duties.”445
Primary and secondary school public teachers are not required or even
expected to communicate with students using social media like Facebook
or MySpace, and, therefore, these communications are not made pursuant
to a teacher’s official duties.446 Furthermore, these communications will
441

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added).

442

Id.

443

Id.

444

Id. at 423-24.

445

See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 309 (D. Conn 2008) (quoting
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421).
446

Many states require unions and school districts to bargain on “wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment.” Teacher’s Unions and Collective Bargaining: Resolving
Conflicts, FINDLAW.COM,
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likely occur after school hours when the teachers are not on school
premises and will not involve the use of school equipment.447 Therefore,
unlike the attorney-plaintiff’s speech in Garcetti, these communications
will almost always not be made pursuant to a teacher’s “official duties”
even if the communication is consistent with a teacher’s official duties
while the teacher is present at school.448
[135] Notably, neither of the two most frequently discussed district court
decisions involving teachers’ free speech claims regarding social media
communications with students applied the Garcetti holding.449 In
Spanierman, the district court concluded that Garcetti did not apply
because the teacher was not obligated to make the speech450 noting that the
http://education.findlaw.com/teachers-rights/teacher-s-unions-and-collective-bargaining-r
esolving-conflicts.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the line between “on-duty” and “off-duty” teacher responsibilities may be specified
in a collective bargaining agreement.
447

See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309.

448

See id. In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court acknowledged this point in
Connick when the Court observed that employee speech which transpires entirely on the
employee’s own time, and in non-work areas of the office, may bring different factors
into the Pickering calculus. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 n.13 (1983). A
teacher’s off-campus speech to students using social media, because it does not involve
use of the employer’s premises, is yet another step removed from the situation described
in Connick.
449

See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309; see also Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No.
07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
450

Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309. The Second Circuit’s current test is broader. See
Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010). This test is two-pronged:
(1) whether the speech is “in furtherance of” an employee’s “core duties,” and (2)
whether there is a relevant “citizen analogue” to the employee’s speech. See id. at 198,
203, 208. But even under this broader test, Spanierman’s speech would not qualify as
speech made pursuant to his official duties—his speech was not in furtherance of any
core duty, and citizen analogues existed. Off-campus teacher-to-student social media
speech should not be regulated under Garcetti regardless of the precise contours of
Garcetti’s reach. See supra Part VI.A. Judge Calabresi, dissenting in Weintraub,
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record contained no evidence that the plaintiff “was under any obligation
to make the statements he made on MySpace.”451 Instead, the court used
the Pickering-Connick standard.452 Similarly, in Snyder, the district court
analyzed the claim under Pickering-Connick instead of Garcetti.453
[136] The policy concerns enumerated in Garcetti should be construed in
light of Garcetti’s facts. One major concern underlying Garcetti was the
Court’s fear of “constitutionaliz[ing] the employee grievance
[process].”454 To avoid this result in Garcetti, the Court justified the
quelling of Ceballos’ speech based on workplace efficiency concerns.455
However, the district attorney’s speech in Garcetti occurred at the
workplace, presumably distracting the attorney, his superiors, and others
from performing their official duties.456 While it is possible that offcampus teacher-to-student speech using social media might result in some
workplace disruption, this speech, unlike the speech in Garcetti, will less
directly impair workplace efficiency.457 Thus, the Garcetti Court’s
proposed a test similar to the district court’s test in Spanierman. Judge Calabresi
proposed that an employee’s speech is “pursuant to official duties” when the employee is
required to make such speech in the course of fulfilling his job duties. Weintraub, 593
F.3d at 208 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). In short, the employer must in some way rely on
the employee’s speech, “as where the speech is an ‘official communications’ or is used
by the employer to ‘promote the employer’s mission.’” Id. (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 422-23 (2006)).
451

Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 309 (D. Conn 2008).

452

See id. at 309.

453

See Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *14, 16.

454

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).

455

See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19.

456

Id. at 422-23.

457

This Article contends that the Pickering balancing test is still the proper standard for
evaluating teacher speech made outside the workplace.
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workplace efficiency concerns do not justify extending Garcetti to a
teacher’s off-campus speech to students using social media.
[137] Workplace efficiency concerns are important, but with respect to a
teacher’s off-campus speech to students, they are better addressed using
the Pickering balancing test. This Article’s proposed test for evaluating
teacher-to-student speech allows school districts to regulate speech based
on its disruptive effect on school grounds.
[138] Furthermore, in Garcetti, the Court also acknowledged that its
holding might not be appropriate in an educational context even when that
context involves on-campus speech.458 The Court declined to articulate a
comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties
in cases where there “[may be] room for serious debate.”459 In Garcetti,
the majority, in discussing academic freedom, declined to decide whether
this rule would apply to cases involving educational speech.460 The Court
remarked “that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom
instruction [may] implicate[] additional constitutional interests that are not
fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech
jurisprudence.”461 These concerns are heightened with respect to the
regulation of teacher off-campus speech.
[139] Lower courts have often applied the Garcetti requirement to
458

See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.

459

Id. at 424.

460

Id. at 425. The Court did not explicitly differentiate between university-level
professor speech and K-12 teacher speech protections when it discussed academic
freedom. See id. But there may be reasons for extending greater First Amendment
protection to the former. See supra note 309.
461

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. While these concerns certainly encompass university-level
professor speech, the extent to which they apply to secondary or primary teacher speech
remain unclear, since the Court cited only university-level speech cases in support of this
proposition.
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teacher speech made on campus during working hours,462 but no federal
court has yet used Garcetti to evaluate a teacher’s off-campus speech to a
student. There is good reason for this: allowing states or school districts to
limit teacher-to-student speech using social media would cast an
extraordinarily wide net, essentially prohibiting the electronic equivalent
of a student-teacher interaction on Main Street.
[140] Furthermore,
treating
any
teacher-student
off-campus
communication as a teacher’s official speech, and therefore unprotected
speech, would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s wariness
regarding blanket restrictions on public employees’ speech.463 Even when
a public employee’s speech is made in a work setting, the Court has
refused to recognize that “all speech within the office is automatically
exposed to restriction.”464 The Court in Garcetti noted that some speech
made by a public employee is protected even when the speech occurs
while the employee is working at his workplace.465 In Connick, the Court
also addressed this issue, cautioning that its holding should not be read to
“suggest that speech on [even] private matters falls into one of the narrow
and well-defined classes of expression which carries so little social value,
such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit . . . [this] expression by all
persons in [the] jurisdiction.”466 Importantly, Garcetti did not overturn
Givhan, a case recognizing a teacher’s free speech rights on campus when
the speech occurred during working hours.467 Garcetti, of course, did not
462

See, e.g., Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir.
2007).
463

See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995).

464

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420-21.

465

See id.

466

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).

467

See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412-13, 415-16 (1979).
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overrule Pickering.468
[141] Finally, the Court in Garcetti warned about the danger of undue
judicial interference in government business, noting that if the Court were
to hold in favor of the plaintiff, this decision “would commit state and
federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial
oversight of communications between and among government employees
and their superiors in the course of official business.”469 Because these
teacher communications would occur outside the course of official
business, the Garcetti Court’s concerns are not applicable.
B. Hazelwood Will Rarely Apply to Teachers’ Off-Campus
Speech to Students Using Social Media
[142] Most, if not all, off-campus teacher-student communications using
social media will not be school-sponsored speech. Therefore, Hazelwood
should rarely, if ever, be applied to regulate this speech.
[143] Under Hazelwood, school administrators can regulate student
speech if three requirements are met: (1) the speech is part of a school
supervised learning experience, (2) the speech could reasonably be
interpreted as the school’s speech, and (3) the school has a legitimate
pedagogical reason for regulating the speech.470 In Hazelwood, the
Supreme Court held that school officials “may exercise control over the
contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school’s
journalism curriculum,”471 so long as the official’s actions were
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”472 The Court
468

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19.

469

Id. at 423 (emphasis added).

470

See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-73 (1988).

471

Id. at 262, 273.

472

Id. at 273.
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concluded that the school principal’s actions were reasonable in
prohibiting the publication of two articles because of privacy concerns for
the subject of the stories and for third parties, and because the subject
matter was inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school.473
[144] While some lower courts have used the Hazelwood test to evaluate
teachers’ classroom speech,474 these cases invariably involved speech
related to school curriculum. Although the Internet does blur the
boundaries between speech on and off-campus, the Hazelwood test should
not be applied to a teacher’s off-campus communications with students.
[145] Hazelwood is not the proper test for evaluating teacher-student
communication using social media for many reasons. First, Hazelwood
involved on-campus speech by students.475 For this reason alone, it is
difficult to apply Hazelwood to teachers’ off-campus speech.
[146] Second and more importantly, crucial to the Court’s holding in
Hazelwood was its conclusion that the school newspaper was a “school
supervised learning experience” that might reasonably be perceived as the
school’s speech.476 The Court defined “school supervised learning
473

See id. at 261, 263.

474

See Kramer v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 715 F. Supp. 2d 335, 353-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(noting that there is disagreement among the federal courts of appeals on whether teacher
classroom speech should be analyzed under Garcetti or Hazelwood; the court analyzed
the issue under both tests). The Second Circuit is among the courts that have extended
the Supreme Court's standard for student speech to teachers' instructional speech. Id. at
354; see, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719,
722-23 (2d Cir. 1994). But see Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir.
2010) (determining that a grievance filed by a teacher was unprotected speech pursuant to
Garcetti without considering the relevance of the teacher’s position as an educator under
Hazelwood). Most of the cases applying Hazelwood to teachers’ instructional speech
were decided pre-Garcetti. See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993).
475

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262.

476

Id. at 270-71, 273.
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experiences” as those activities that may be characterized as part of the
school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom
setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to
impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and
audiences.477 The Court’s inclusion of “activities outside the traditional
classroom” in context refers to school-sponsored activities, such as a
student newspaper.478
[147] It is highly likely that most, if not all, teacher-student
communication via social media would not qualify as “school supervised
learning experiences.” Particularly if the teacher speech is created offcampus, without using any school-supplied technology or equipment, it is
difficult to perceive this speech as part of the school curriculum. By
contrast, in Hazelwood, while the school’s journalism students wrote and
edited the newspaper, this work was formally supervised by a faculty
member and funded by the local board of education.479 As previously
discussed, teachers are not required to communicate with students using
social media. A teacher who chooses to interact with students using these
technologies is not, in any formal sense, supervising a student’s learning
experience, and, therefore, it is difficult to envision most of these
interactions as part of any formal school curriculum. Furthermore, unless
school equipment or technology is used in this communication or unless
the local school district requires the teacher to communicate in this
fashion, the school district is not “funding” this interaction.
[148] In sum, even if students might reasonably perceive a teacher’s
speech to be the speech of the school, the Hazelwood test would not apply
because it is highly likely that a teacher’s off-campus speech will not be
part of any formalized school curriculum.
477

Id. at 271 (emphasis added).

478

Id.

479

Id. at 262-63.
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[149] Finally, even if students might reasonably perceive a teacher’s
speech to be the speech of the school, and even if the teacher’s speech
might reasonably be interpreted as curricular speech, the Hazelwood test is
still inapplicable. If a teacher’s speech is deemed “part of the curriculum”
and thus a “school supervised learning activity,” Garcetti would govern
this question because the speech would almost certainly involve a
teacher’s “official duties.”480 As previously discussed, Garcetti does not
apply either.
C. The Government Speech Doctrine Will Rarely Apply to
Teachers’ Off-Campus Speech to Students Using Social Media
[150] Whatever the outer limits of the evolving government speech
doctrine and whether or not it is distinct from Garcetti, this doctrine would
not apply to most, maybe the vast majority, of teacher off-campus
communications with students using social media since a reasonable
observer would rarely conclude that this speech was the school’s speech.
More specifically, since teacher speech in this context will rarely be made
pursuant to a teacher’s official duties nor qualify as school-sponsored
speech, the government speech doctrine does not apply.481
D. Because Garcetti, Hazelwood, and the Government Speech
Doctrine Rarely Apply to Teachers’ Off-Campus Speech to
Students Using Social Media, the Applicable Test in Most
Circumstances is Pickering-Connick
[151] Except in extraordinary circumstances, neither Garcetti,
Hazelwood, nor the government speech doctrine will apply to a teacher’s
480

In these circumstances, Garcetti would govern even when a teacher’s speech pursuant
to his “official duties” is limited to required speech: if the speech is part of the
curriculum, the teacher’s speech is “commissioned,” and therefore made pursuant to the
teacher’s official duties. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
481

As previously discussed, there is a significant overlap between Garcetti and the
government speech doctrine. See supra Part VI.A.
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off-campus communications to a student using social media since the
speech is not made pursuant to a teacher’s official duties, is not schoolsponsored, and is not “government speech.” Consequently, in most
circumstances, the appropriate test for evaluating a teacher’s constitutional
rights with respect to off-campus communications to students using social
media is Pickering-Connick.482
[152] As previously noted, public employees can challenge government
restrictions of their free speech rights by bringing a facial challenge to the
regulation or by bringing an “as applied” challenge, typically a retaliatory
discharge claim.483 Either way, the governing law is PickeringConnick.484
[153] In Pickering, the Supreme Court addressed a teacher’s off-campus
free speech rights, holding that a teacher’s speech criticizing school
officials was protected under the First Amendment.485 The Supreme Court
482

A public entity’s ability to regulate an employee’s speech is lowest when the
employee is speaking as a citizen. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994)
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he government as employer . . . has far broader powers than does
the government as sovereign.”). A public entity’s ability to regulate an employee’s
speech at the outer fringes of the employment relationship is less than its ability to
regulate an employee’s required speech. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423-24.
483

See supra Part IV.A.

484

The Pickering balancing test mirrors the Supreme Court’s approach to content neutral
speech regulations: in short, the Pickering balancing test is an intermediate scrutiny test.
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 796 (2007). Under intermediate
scrutiny, speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest and leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also Waters, 511 U.S. at
675. “Narrowly tailored” means the restriction is not “substantially broader than
necessary to achieve the government’s interest;” it does not require the restriction to be
the least restrictive means to achieve this goal. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800; see also Waters,
511 U.S. at 674-75.
485

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564, 572-74 (1968).
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rejected the notion that teachers are not entitled to First Amendment
rights, reasoning that “[t]he public[’s] interest in having free and
unhindered debate on matters of public importance . . . [is a] core value of
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”486 Under the guidelines
set out in the Connick decision, a teacher’s off-campus speech must satisfy
a two-part test.487 First, the teacher’s speech must involve a matter of
legitimate public concern.488 To make this determination, courts examine
the “content, form, and context” of the speech.489 Second, if the speech
does involve a matter of legitimate public concern, courts employ a
balancing test to determine whether the employer’s interests in prohibiting
the speech outweigh the teacher’s interests in making the speech and the
audience’s interests in hearing the speech.490 If the speech meets both
parts of this test, it is protected under the First Amendment, but if it fails
either part, the speech is unprotected.491 In other words, schools can
suppress teacher speech only when the teacher’s speech either fails to
implicate a public concern or fails the Pickering balancing test.492
[154] Notably, even when a teacher’s social media speech is made in
private, the First Amendment is still applicable.493 With respect to the
Pickering balancing test, the analysis of a public employee’s private
expression may bring additional factors to this calculus, such as the
486

Id. at 573-74.

487

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148-50 (1983).

488

See id. at 146.

489

Id. at 147-48.

490

See id. at 149-50.

491

See id. at 154.

492

See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-151, 154.

493

See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1979).
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manner, time, and place of the employee’s speech.494 However, if the
speech meets both required elements of the Pickering-Connick test, the
speech is protected even if it is expressed privately.495
VII. UNDER PICKERING-CONNICK, SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ CATEGORICAL
BANS OF TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL
MEDIA ARE LIKELY OVERBROAD AND THUS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. Overbreadth Doctrine: Facial Challenges
[155] In a First Amendment free speech context, litigants are permitted
to challenge a government speech restriction when it abridges the speech
rights of parties not before the court, even if the restriction would be
constitutional as-applied to the litigant.496 Thus, facial challenges are an
exception to the general notion that constitutional rights are personal.497
[156] A speech restriction is overbroad and therefore unconstitutional
when the restriction substantially burdens protected speech and the
restriction is not amenable to a limiting interpretation.498
[157] A remedy based on the overbreadth doctrine is “strong
medicine.”499 However, this medicine is necessary because the threat of
494

Id. at 415 n.4.

495

See id. at 412-13, 415.

496

See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999); see
also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
497

See L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. at 39.

498

See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613-16.

499

Id. at 613. The Court noted that the overbreadth doctrine has been employed
“sparingly, and only as a last resort.” Id. This observation is questionable. See United
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1579, 1592 (2010) (holding that a federal statute
criminalizing the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal
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enforcement of an overbroad restriction may deter or chill others’
constitutionally protected speech.500 Rather than “vindicating their rights
through case-by-case litigation, [many people] will choose simply to
abstain from protected speech.”501 This chilling effect harms society as a
whole, adversely affecting the marketplace of ideas.502
[158] Nevertheless, the overbreadth doctrine also creates social costs
when it blocks the application of a speech restriction to constitutionally
unprotected speech.503 To ensure that these costs do not outweigh the
benefits of declaring a speech restriction overbroad, a claimant must
establish that there is a real danger that the restriction will substantially
burden protected speech.504 In short, a court may find a restriction
cruelty was overbroad); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987)
(holding that a municipal ordinance making it unlawful to interrupt a police officer
during the officer’s performance of his duties was overbroad); see also Bd. of Airport
Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 577 (1987) (holding an airport regulation
prohibiting the exercise of any First Amendment rights was overbroad). But see
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618 (holding that a state statute prohibiting certain public
employees from engaging in active, partisan political campaigning was not overbroad,
even though the statute purportedly restricted the wearing of political buttons or the use
of bumper stickers). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction about Facial
Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915 (2011) (noting that “rare” facial challenges are not so
rare).
500

Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (noting that this is especially true when
the statute imposes criminal sanctions).
501

Id.

502

Id.

503

Id.

504

See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. A number of Supreme Court decisions have held that
speech restrictions substantially infringed on protected speech. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at
1592 (concluding that the burden on protected speech was substantial because the animal
cruelty statute would limit protected speech like hunting magazines and videos); see also
Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. at 574-75 (concluding that the burden on protected speech
was substantial because the restriction prohibited any First Amendment expression).
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overbroad and therefore unconstitutional when “‘a substantial number of
its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s
plainly legitimate sweep.’”505 Thus, “‘[t]he first step in overbreadth
analysis is to construe the challenged statute [because] it is impossible to
determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the
statute covers.’”506 Notably, “[f]acial overbreadth has not been invoked
when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the
challenged statute” that would remove the threat or deterrence to
constitutionally protected speech.507
[159] The regulation in Jews for Jesus, Inc. is an example of the
Supreme Court’s use of the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate a blanket
ban of speech.508 In this case, the regulation banned all First Amendment
expression, including talking and reading, within the Central Terminal
Area of the Los Angeles International Airport.509 The Court concluded
that no conceivable government interest could justify this categorical
ban.510 Because the regulation could not be limited to ameliorate this
505

Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)). See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16. A
restriction should not be invalidated on its face merely because it is possible to conceive
of a single impermissible application. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987)
(citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
506

Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293
(2008)).
507

Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 617-18 (noting that the state interpreted the statute to
forbid only active, partisan political campaigning).
508

Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. at 569; see Harman v. City of N.Y., 140 F.3d 111, 124
(2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a regulation requiring employees of two of New York’s
largest social services agencies to obtain approval before speaking to the media was
unconstitutional on both overbreadth and as-applied grounds).
509

See Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. at 570-71, 574-75.

510

Id. at 575 (noting that this would be the case even assuming the airport was a
nonpublic forum).
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substantial burden on protected speech, the Court held the ban
unconstitutional.511
[160] Similarly, as previously discussed, in National Treasury
Employees Union (“NTEU”), the Supreme Court held that a congressional
ban prohibiting almost all federal employees from receiving honoraria for
making speeches or writing articles was overbroad and thus violated the
plaintiff-respondents’ First Amendment free speech rights.512 In essence,
the ban restricted a federal employee from accepting honoraria for this
expression, even when the expression was unrelated to work.513 The ban
did not directly prohibit any speech and did not discriminate “among
speakers based on the content or viewpoint of their message[].”514
However, the Court concluded that the prohibition on compensation
imposed a significant burden on protected expressive activity and
therefore violated the First Amendment.515
[161] NTEU demonstrated the Court’s willingness to apply facial
analysis to a workplace regulation.516 Notably, the ban on receiving
honoraria did not seek to regulate particular employees’ workplace
responsibilities; rather, the ban attempted to regulate speech on the outer
fringes of the employment relationship.517 Despite the relative deference

511

See id. at 577.

512

United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995). In NTEU,
the Court limited the remedy to employees below grade GS-16. Id. at 478.
513

Id. at 457.

514

Id. at 468.

515

Id.

516

See id. at 477-78.

517

See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 478.
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provided by Pickering-Connick’s intermediate level review,518 the Court
found the ban facially unconstitutional.519
[162] In both Jews for Jesus, Inc. and NTEU, the Supreme Court has
demonstrated its apprehension regarding broad restrictions on speech,
particularly when the restrictions prohibit speech before it occurs.
B. Categorical Bans on Teachers’ Off-Campus Speech to
Students Are Likely Overbroad and Thus Facially
Unconstitutional
[163] Categorical bans520 regarding off-campus teacher-to-student
speech using social media at least arguably prohibit a substantial amount
of protected speech. Furthermore, given the absolute proscription on
speech contained in these bans, courts will be unable to curtail this
substantial overbreadth by limiting the restriction. Consequently, school
districts’ bans within this area of speech are, at least arguably, facially
unconstitutional.521
[164] Under Pickering-Connick, teacher speech is protected when the
speech implicates a public concern and survives the Pickering balancing
518

See Bhagwat, supra note 484, at 795 (noting that the Pickering balancing test is
essentially an intermediate scrutiny test).
519

See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 454, 477-78. NTEU provides a basis for
facial challenges to public employee workplace speech regulations, and, analogously,
student speech regulations. See id.
520

Many policies regulating teacher-student communication using non-school sanctioned
social media are categorical bans. See generally NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1, 2, 4.
521

In the absence of studies indicating that little speech in this area is protected speech,
courts should err on the side of protecting teacher speech. Further study of the content of
these communications would be helpful; unfortunately, blanket bans make these studies
impossible.
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test.522 Certainly, some teacher-student speech using social media would
implicate a public concern. In addition, some of this speech would pass
the Pickering balancing test because the teacher’s interest in uttering the
speech and the students’ interest in hearing the speech would outweigh the
school’s interests in censoring the speech. Therefore, if the amount of
protected speech restricted is substantial and the composition of the
audience does not provide a sufficient justification for this ban, then the
restriction is unconstitutional. School districts’ blanket bans of this
speech, at least arguably, curtail a substantial amount of protected speech.
[165] The Supreme Court has demonstrated its wariness of large-scale
restrictions on public employee speech, at least when the restriction
prohibits speech before the speech occurs.523 In NTEU, the Court set a
high bar when it observed that the government, in the context of a blanket
policy designed to restrict expression by a large number of potential
speakers, “‘must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a
vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and
future expression are outweighed by that expression’s ‘necessary impact
on the actual operation’ of the Government.’”524 A categorical ban of offcampus teacher-to-student speech using social media likely fails this test.
[166] The Supreme Court, in both Jews for Jesus, Inc. and NTEU, has
held that regulations restricting large quantities of speech before the
speech occurs are overbroad and thus unconstitutional even when the bans
were content neutral.525 In Jews for Jesus, Inc., the Supreme Court
522

See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.a.

523

See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 468; see also Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482
U.S. at 576-77.
524

Harman v. City of N.Y., 140 F.3d 111, 118 (1998) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps.
Union, 513 U.S. at 468 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571)).
525

See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 468; see also Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482
U.S. at 577. But see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616-17 (1973) (implying that
the speech restriction protected public employees from being coerced to participate in
partisan political activities).
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observed that the ban was overbroad even if the airport was a nonpublic
forum.526 A ban on off-campus teacher speech to students using social
media is similar to the complete ban of all First Amendment expression in
Jews for Jesus, Inc. because at least in the area of teacher social media
communications to students off-campus, these policies typically make no
exceptions for any protected speech.527 Furthermore, these categorical
bans exceed the ban involved in NTEU. Notably, the ban in NTEU
eliminated the financial incentive to engage in speech, but did not forbid
the speech itself.528 With respect to bans on teacher speech in the social
media context, the restriction directly regulates speech.
[167] Under these categorical bans, a teacher would be prohibited from
allowing a student to view her social media page even if the page
contained her reasons for supporting a local political candidate or, similar
to the criticism in Pickering, her criticism of the Board of Education’s
funding priorities. The Supreme Court has held that speech made
privately is still protected under Pickering-Connick.529
[168] Moreover, the amount of restricted teacher speech is staggering. In
New York City alone, the policy restricts approximately 75,000
teachers.530
[169] Of course, the Supreme Court precedents mostly involve speech
526

Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. at 575.

527

See NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1,
4 (noting that even in the case of a prior restraint, there is at least a possibility that the
speaker will be allowed to communicate her message).
528

See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 468.

529

See, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412, 414 (1979).

530

See NYC Dramatically Slashes Number of Teachers Granted Tenure, CBS NEW YORK
(July 27, 2011, 10:27 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/07/27/nyc-dramaticallyslashes-number-of-teachers-granted-tenure/.
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between adults. However, banning this speech because the audience is
students is inconsistent with the First Amendment for many reasons. First,
at least some of these students will have reached the age of majority.
Second, and more importantly, there is no limit as to when students should
begin learning about the political process and other current issues. While
some issues might not be appropriate for the maturity level of younger
students, a complete ban is a flawed response to this concern. The
Supreme Court in Pickering protected the teacher’s speech even though
some of his audience could have been his own students. The Court did not
distinguish among Pickering’s audience members based on age, student
status, or voting eligibility. Furthermore, the Court’s observation that
“free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate”531 also applies to the future electorate.
[170] Unsurprisingly, the only time that a court has addressed a
categorical ban of this nature, the court enjoined the speech restriction.532
The court concluded that “social networking is extensively used by
educators.”533
Furthermore, the court found the “breadth of the
prohibition [to be] staggering.”534 Consequently, the court held that the
531

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968).

532

See, e.g., NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note
2, at 4 (2012). A more narrowly drawn ban restricting particular conduct, such as sexual
assault, would be constitutional. But school districts typically ban all speech in order to
address issues like inappropriate sexual contact between teachers and students. See also
David W. Chen and Patrick McGeehan, Social Media Rules Limit New York StudentTeacher Contact, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/nyregion/social-media-rules-for-nyc-school-stafflimits-contact-with-students.html?pagewanted=all. The impetus behind the NYC DOE’s
ban was inappropriate relationships between teachers and students that began or were
conducted using social media. Notably, the DOE’s policy does not address teacher cell
phone use. Teachers can thus still call students, although they can still be disciplined for
inappropriate conduct. See id.
533

Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 12.

534

Id.
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AHSPA would have a significant “chilling effect” on free speech.535
Since this “chilling effect” was sufficiently immediate, the court held that
the resulting injury was irreparable.536 Other categorical bans on this type
of speech are likely similarly unconstitutional.
VIII. UNDER PICKERING-CONNICK, SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ MORE
NARROWLY DRAWN RESTRICTIONS OF TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS
SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL MEDIA WILL PROBABLY NOT BE
OVERBROAD
[171] More narrowly drawn restrictions governing off-campus teacherto-student speech using social media will probably not be overbroad. For
example, speech prohibiting a teacher from disclosing confidential student
information or engaging in sexually predatory speech would not be
facially unconstitutional. The constitutionality of these restrictions would
need to be addressed on an as-applied basis. However, instead of
narrowly restricting teacher speech in this more focused manner, many
districts have categorically banned all teacher-to-student speech using
social media.537
IX. UNDER PICKERING-CONNICK, SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ CATEGORICAL
BANS OF TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL
MEDIA WILL BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL “AS-APPLIED” TO AT LEAST
SOME TEACHER SPEECH
[172] A categorical ban of off-campus teacher speech to students using
social media may also be unconstitutional under the more common “asapplied challenge.”538 In an “as-applied” challenge, the litigant argues that
535

Id.

536

Id.

537

See NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1,

4.
538

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 587 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Santa Monica Food

100

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIX, Issue 2

the law is unconstitutional as applied to the specific facts of the claimant’s
case.539
[173] Under Pickering-Connick, teacher speech is protected when the
speech implicates a public concern and survives the Pickering balancing
test.540 For many of the same reasons a categorical ban would be
unconstitutionally overbroad, the ban would also be unconstitutional as
applied to a specific claimant. Notably, at least some teacher-student
speech using social media would implicate a public concern and at least
some of this speech would also pass the Pickering balancing test because
the teacher’s interest in uttering the speech and the students’ interest in
hearing the speech would outweigh the school’s interests in censoring the
speech. Consequently, in at least some circumstances, a ban on teacher
speech would be unconstitutional as applied to this teacher speech under
the current Pickering-Connick test.
[174] The Pickering balancing test is essentially an intermediate scrutiny
test.541 Therefore, intermediate scrutiny cases are helpful are helpful in
understanding Pickering.
[175] Under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, speech restrictions must
Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006)).
539

Reed, 587 F.3d at 974 (citing Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1034).

540

See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.a.

541

See Bhagwat, supra note 484, at 792. Intermediate scrutiny applies when courts
determine the constitutionality of content-neutral speech restrictions enacted by a
government entity in its “sovereign” capacity. See id. at 791-92. Courts employ the
Pickering-Connick standard to analyze public employee free speech issues, at least when
Garcetti does not apply. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80-82 (2004)
(analyzing the plaintiff’s speech in under the Pickering-Connick standard). These
standards overlap. In particular, the time, place, and manner factors involved in
intermediate scrutiny are relevant in analyzing both the public concern and balancing
requirements of Pickering-Connick. See id. at 80-81.

101

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIX, Issue 2

(1) serve a significant government interest, (2) leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information, and (3) be
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.542 “Narrowly tailored” means that
the restriction is not “substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
government’s interest:” it does not require the restriction to be the least
restrictive means to achieve this goal.543 The latter two components of
this test are particularly instructive in understanding Pickering.
[176] While categorical bans of off-campus teacher-to-student speech
using social media leave open ample traditional channels of
communication for the information, in the social media age, this may not
be sufficient. City of Ladue is illustrative even if distinguishable.544
When the City of Ladue prohibited a venerable, cost-effective way of
communicating important speech using homemade signs on property
owners’ lawns, the Court held the restriction unconstitutional.545 The
Court noted its historical “concern with laws that foreclose an entire
medium of expression.”546 In particular, the Court reasoned that
“[r]esidential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of
542

See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994); see also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
543

Ward, 491 U.S. at 800; see Waters, 511 U.S. at 675.

544

See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994). This case is not directly on point.
In City of Ladue, the Court assumed, arguendo, that the restrictions were content-neutral,
but ultimately subjected the restrictions to a heightened standard of review. See id. at 49,
58-59. As one commentator has observed, despite citing many content-neutral cases
involving intermediate scrutiny, the Court applied a more stringent standard because of
the long constitutional tradition of respecting “individual liberty in the home,” including
the liberty to speak there. Bhagwat, supra note 484, at 790. In effect, the Court
subjected the regulation to strict scrutiny. Commentators have speculated that a
heightened standard of review may be appropriate when the speech occurs on private
property. See, e.g., id. at 790-91.
545

See City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 58-59.

546

Id. at 55.
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communication,” for both the affluent and the less-than-affluent, and no
“practical substitute” for this speech may exist.547
[177] Similarly, although social media may not qualify as a “venerable”
means of communication, categorical bans on teacher-to-student offcampus speech using social media foreclose an entire medium of
expression and this medium is relatively inexpensive. Furthermore, given
the amount of time people devote to using social media, there may be no
“practical substitute” for this communication. Therefore, in our electronic
age, keeping open traditional channels of communication may not be
enough.
[178] But even assuming these bans serve a legitimate government
interest and leave open ample channels of communication, these bans may
also be unconstitutional as applied to particular teacher speech because
they are substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s
interest. More specifically, if the legitimate government interest is
protecting students from predatory sexual conduct, prohibiting all offcampus teachers to student social media speech is similar to killing a fly
with a bazooka.548 Presumably, the vast majority of teacher speech will
not involve predatory sexual conduct.
X. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH TO REGULATING
TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL MEDIA
A. Pickering-Connick Revisited
[179] School officials’ interests in limiting a teacher’s opportunity to
engage in public debate is most limited when the teacher is speaking as a
member of the general public, and at least some teacher social media
speech will be made in the teacher’s role as a member of the general
547

Id. at 57.

548

States miss a social-media education opportunity, supra note 73.
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public. As the Court in Pickering observed, where “the fact of
employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the
subject matter of the public communication by the teacher . . . it is
necessary to regard the teacher as a member of the general public.”549
[180] Under Pickering-Connick, school authorities can regulate teacher
speech when the speech does not implicate a public concern or the speech
fails the Pickering balancing test.550 Therefore, any teacher speech that
addresses a matter of public concern is protected regardless of whether the
medium of expression involves social media or whether the primary
audience is students, unless the speech fails the second part of the
Pickering test. In essence, school authorities can regulate a teacher’s
speech to students, at least when the speech implicates a public concern,
only when the school’s interests in prohibiting the speech outweigh the
teacher’s interests in disseminating the information and the audience’s
interests in hearing the information.
B. One Major Drawback of the Current Law: Under
Pickering-Connick, Teacher Speech is Protected Only if the
Speech Implicates a Matter of Public Concern
[181] The Pickering-Connick test has one major drawback. Under this
test, school officials can censor any teacher-student speech that does not
implicate a public concern, regardless of the outcome under the Pickering
balancing test.551 In particular, the requirement that the speech implicate a
public concern might enable school officials to regulate a significant
amount of teachers’ communications with students using social media.552
549

Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).

550

See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.a.

551

See generally Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (of course, school officials can also prohibit
teacher speech that fails the Pickering balancing test).
552

To date, no systematic studies analyzing the types of speech that might occur between
teachers and students using non-school-sanctioned social media are available. But a
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[182] As this Article suggests, teachers’ off-campus speech rights using
social media should be more fully protected: in particular, teacher speech,
absent disruption to the work or learning environment, should be protected
because the speech is made at the outer fringes of the employment
relationship.553 Consequently, this Article proposes eliminating the public
concern requirement with respect to teacher speech in this context.554
1. A Long-Standing Struggle for Lower Courts:
Deciding Whether Speech Implicates a Public Concern
[183] The Supreme Court recently observed, more than forty years after
its decision in Pickering, that “‘the boundaries of the public concern test
are not well defined.’”555 Legal commentators have repeatedly voiced this
same concern.556 Whether speech implicates a “public concern” has as
significant portion of this speech might not implicate a public concern. As discussed
more fully infra Part X.B.1, in the context of social media, the “public concern” threshold
would not provide a pretrial, gatekeeping function.
553

As explained more fully infra Part X.B.3, the public concern element is best treated, at
least in the context of off-campus teacher-to-student speech using social media, as a
limitation on the reach of Garcetti’s holding, rather than as a separate element.
554

Given the doctrinal confusion created by the “public concern” requirement and the
adequacy of the Pickering balancing test to address the competing free speech concerns,
the “public concern” requirement should be eliminated for all public employees. The
focus of this Article, however, is on teachers using social media to communicate with
students in an off-campus setting. Given the interactive, rapidly evolving nature of social
media speech and the indirect benefits this speech might generate, a public concern
limitation is particularly unnecessary.
555

Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe,
543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004)).
556

One legal commentator has criticized the public-concern requirement because of its
“inherent elasticity.” See Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A
Critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech
Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 121, 125 (1996). The Supreme Court’s explanations of
“public concern” “‘have provided enough guidance to confuse everyone.’” Id. at 131
(quoting D. Gordon Smith, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Standards for
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much to do with creative lawyering as it does with the speech itself.557
[184] With respect to “public concern,” the Supreme Court recently
summarized its guidelines in Snyder.558 “Speech deals with matters of
public concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community,’”559 or when it “‘is
a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest
and of value and concern to the public.’”560 In contrast, private speech is
speech “‘solely in the individual interest of the speaker and [the speaker’s]
audience’”561 that does nothing to inform the public about any aspect of
the employing agency’s functioning or operation.562
Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 258 (1990)). Another commentator has
suggested that employees can manipulate the requirement by stating “‘virtually any
criticism of a public employer in terms that will satisfy the public concern test.’” David
L. Hudson, Jr., Balancing Act: Public Employees and Free Speech, 3 FIRST REP. 2, 25
(Dec. 2002),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/FirstReport.
PublicEmployees.pdf (quoting Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination
Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 529, 556 (1998)). A number of commentators have concluded that the
fundamental problem with the “public concern” threshold test is that no one knows how
“public concern” is defined. See id. at 25 (citing Smith, supra, at 258); Darryn Cathryn
Beckstrom, Note, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine and Academic
Speech after Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1221 (2010) (noting that “[i]t
is unclear what constitutes a matter of public concern under the public employee speech
doctrine”).
557

See Hudson, supra note 556, at 25 (citing Rosenthal, supra note 556, at 556).

558

See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1211.

559

Id. at 1216 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).

560

Id. (quoting City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83-84).

561

Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762
(1985)).
562

Id. (quoting City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 84).
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[185] Deciding whether speech implicates a public or private concern
requires courts to examine the content, form, and context of the speech.563
“In considering [the] content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive,
and it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech,
including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.”564 In
Snyder, the Court observed that reaching as broad a public audience as
possible was one aspect in evaluating whether the content implicated a
public concern.565 This is true even when part of the speech is false, as it
was in Snyder.566
[186] In addition to the content, form, and context of the speech, courts
may also examine the motivation behind the speech.567 This inquiry
involves determining whether the public concern or private grievance
aspect of the speech was the primary motivation behind the speech.568
563

Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761).

564

Id. The public concern requirement also involves courts in evaluating the content of
the speech, something the First Amendment generally forbids.
565

See id. at 1217.

566

See id. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court concluded that protest signs
at a soldier’s funeral were protected speech. See id. at 1219. The signs stated, “You’re
Going to Hell,” and “God Hates Fags.” Id. at 1213. These sentiments suggested, falsely,
that the solder was gay. Id. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting).
567

See SCHNEIDER, supra note 28. If speech involves both public and private
motivations, it is simpler for courts to err on the side of classifying speech as implicating
a public concern and concentrate on the disruption issue. See SMOLLA, supra note 230.
568

See SMOLLA, supra note 230. A speaker’s motive is generally relevant but not
dispositive. Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164, 166 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d, 410 Fed. App. 411,
411 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 104 (2011); SMOLLA, supra note 230; see also Ma,
supra note 556, at 133. But “if an examination of the ‘point of the speech in question’
reveals that the speech is not intended to bring wrongdoing to light or raise issues
because they are of public concern, but instead is intended to further some purely private
interest, the speech is not protected even though it touches upon an issue of public
concern.” 16B MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 46:76 (3d ed. 2012) (citing Vukadinovich v.
Bartels, 853 F.2d 1387, 1390 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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[187] As many commentators have observed, the “public concern”
requirement has created “doctrinal confusion.”569 In particular, it is
unclear whether the “public concern” inquiry is normative or
descriptive.570 In other words, there is confusion over whether courts
should focus on what should be a public concern or what the public is
concerned about.571 In addition, it is unclear how large the audience must
be to qualify as “public” and how interested this audience must be to
qualify as “concerned.”572 The vagaries of this standard make it difficult
to determine whether speech is protected, thereby potentially chilling
protected speech.573 Judge Posner has argued that the public concern test
is simply a way for distinguishing between speech that has social value
and speech that does not.574 However, this statement masks unresolved
difficulties with the public concern test.575
[188] Underlying this “doctrinal confusion” is another fundamental
issue: who decides what constitutes a public concern? At present, “public
concern” is a question of law.576 But are judges best situated to determine
569

See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2145.

570

Id. at 2144.

571

See id.

572

Id.; see also Hoppmann, supra note 103, at 1015 (on problem with defining “public
concern” is how much of the public must be interested in order for the concern to qualify
as public: requiring more than a few interested people runs counter to the antimajoritarian emphasis of First Amendment jurisprudence).
573

See Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2145.

574

See id. (citing Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 1994)).

575

As discussed within this section, the public concern standard is imprecise, allows too
much leeway for subjective judicial value judgments, and provides insufficient guidance
regarding whether judges or the general public should determine social value.
576

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983).
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what should concern or does concern the public?577
[189] For many of these reasons, lower courts, in a general public
employee context, have declined to apply the public concern test in certain
circumstances,578 embraced a “broad conception” of public concern,579 or
577

The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved whether hierarchies of protected
speech exist. The Court has often acknowledged that speech on public issues occupies
the “highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.” Id. at 145, 154 (quoting
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))) (implying that a hierarchy exists). The Court has, however,
recently refused to recognize new categories of unprotected speech. See, e.g., U.S. v.
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010). Furthermore, even if these hierarchies of
protected speech should exist, the question remains as to whether judges are best situated
to determine these hierarchies.
578

See Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2145-49 (discussing the lower court decisions); see
also Eberhardt, 17 F.3d at 1026-27; Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1564 (10th Cir.
1989)). The “public concern” threshold does not apply to artistic endeavors. Eberhardt,
17 F.3d at 1026-27 (reasoning that the plaintiff’s novel was presumptively protected by
the First Amendment, even if the novel did not implicate a public concern). Nor does it
apply to nonverbal expression when the speech does not occur at work or when the
speech is not about a work-related subject. See Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1560, 1564
(concluding that the “public concern” test did not apply when the speech involved a
police officer’s ownership interest in a video store, which rented some sexually explicit
videos, because this nonverbal expression was not made at work nor about work). And
there is some question as to whether the “public concern” test applies to hybrid
constitutional claims, those involving intertwined First Amendment claims such as free
speech and free association. See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir.
2003) (assuming the teacher’s speech implicated a public concern). The “public
concern” test has many purposes. According to the Seventh Circuit, the purpose of the
“public concern” requirement is not to fix the boundaries of the First Amendment, but
rather to allow courts to distinguish between entirely personal grievances and statements
of broader concern regarding a public employee’s job. Eberhardt, 17 F.3d at 1026. As
one commentator observes, “public concern” is “‘measured more by what it is not than
what it is.’” SMOLLA, supra note 230 (quoting Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268
F. Supp. 2d 536, 558 (W.D. Pa. 2003)). Courts tend to conclude that speech implicates a
public concern so long as the employee’s speech is not merely about mundane grievances
exclusively of interest to the affected employee. Id. (citing Nichol, 268 F. Supp. 2d at
558). But, at present, Garcetti likely eliminates most employee, grievance-related
speech, particularly if the speech is made at work. The Second Circuit has observed that
the purpose of the “public concern” threshold is to provide a gatekeeping function for
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sidestepped the issue by holding that other aspects of the claim were not
established.580
[190] In light of these concerns, some commentators have advocated
eliminating the public concern test and applying a general balancing test
instead.581 In the context of off-campus teacher speech using social
media, the “public concern” threshold is an unnecessary requirement since
the balancing aspect of the Pickering test adequately protects all
public employee speech claims. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 193. The threshold applies when
the speech is directed to the employer, made at the place of employment, or directly
concerns the employer in some way. Id. But the amount and interactive, fluid nature of
social media speech likely undermines this gate-keeping function as well.
579

Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2145-46, n.150 (citing Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d
992, 997, 999 (4th Cir. 1985) (concluding that performing in “blackface” implicated a
public concern)). If a public employee’s message implicates both a public concern and a
private matter, the speech is protected, unless the employer can prove it would have
disciplined the employee despite the protected public concern speech. See Spanierman v.
Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310-11 (D. Conn. 2008) (observing that a poem about the
Iraq war on the claimant’s web page might implicate a matter of public concern, even
though the poem was tangential to the dispute); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49. A
plaintiff may have a personal interest in the matter, but this should not be an overriding
one. See Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2003). But, at times, courts have
refused to define “public concern” to include anything that garners the public’s attention,
particularly if that interest is prurient. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84-85
(2004).
580

See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (holding that even if the teacher’s speech
implicated a matter of public concern, his claim failed on other grounds); Melzer, 336
F.3d at 200 (assuming the speech implicated a public concern, but holding that the
Pickering balancing test weighed in favor of the defendants); Papandrea, supra note 153,
at 2146 (citing Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 927, 929 (9th Cir. 2008)).
581

See, e.g., Ma, supra note 556, at 123. Alternative approaches have also been
proposed. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2120 (proposing, at least
presumptively, full First Amendment protection for off-duty, non-work related public
employee speech, unless the speaker is perceived to be speaking for the employer or is
interfering with a clearly articulated message from his employer, or unless the speech
indicates the employee is unfit to perform the duties of his position).
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stakeholder rights. Furthermore, Pickering’s balancing test brings some
parity between the treatment of off-campus social media speech for
teachers and students.
[191] Speech in the social media context adds additional complications
to this “doctrinal confusion.” The amount of social media speech and its
rapidly changing nature pose special problems for the public concern
requirement. A typical Facebook page, for example, contains numerous
text postings and a variety of pictures and videos.582 These postings likely
involve some political or religious speech as well as speech on personal
matters.583 A Facebook user can also share messages, comments, pictures,
and video with other users.584 Furthermore, the information is updated
rapidly; about 62% of Facebook users update their status at least once
every two weeks.585 Most Facebook users comment on other users’
statuses even more frequently, at least one to two days per week.586 Thus,
social media involves extensive amounts of rapidly changing, interactive
speech.
[192] In terms of the “public concern” threshold, the nature of social
media speech poses a number of particular problems. First, the amount
582

See Kyle A. Ferachi, Social Media for Employers and Lawyers Who Advise
Employers, THOMSOM REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Nov. 14, 2011),
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/Insight/2011/11_-_November/Social_m
edia_for_employers_and_lawyers_who_advise_employers/.
583

Id.

584

See Mark Zuckerberg, Our Commitment to the Facebook Community, THE FACEBOOK
BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011, 12:39 PM),
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=10150378701937131.
585

See Keith N. Hampton et. al., Social Networking Sites and Our Lives, Part 2: Who are
Social Networking Site Users, PEW INTERNET (June 16, 2011),
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Technology-and-social-networks/Part-2/Faceb
ook-activities.aspx.
586

Id.
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and interactive nature of social media speech may make it even more
difficult for courts to distinguish speech implicating a public concern from
unprotected speech. In a similar context, appellate courts have struggled
to apply the “public concern” threshold to hybrid First Amendment
claims, those involving intertwined free speech and free association,
because of the challenges involved in determining whether an
association’s speech implicates a public concern.587 As the Second Circuit
has observed, it is problematic for a court to determine whether the
activity of an association—that speaks and acts in a myriad of different
ways—relates to a matter of public concern.588 Associations may deliver
many different statements at many different times and places under many
different circumstances. “What statements, at what locations and in what
context are the ones that should be analyzed is shrouded in uncertainty.”589
The extensive, interactive, and rapidly evolving nature of social media
creates similar uncertainties as to whether a teacher’s social media speech
implicates a public concern.
[193] Second, and relatedly, given the broad test for “public concern”
and the varied contents of a typical social media page like Facebook, it is
likely that some aspect of a social media page will implicate a public
concern.590 Consequently, any benefit of judicial efficiency inuring from

587

See, e.g., Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 2003).

588

See id.

589

Id.

590

See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310-11 (D. Conn 2008). When
government employees comment on matters outside the issues of their workplace, “they
are more likely to be perceived as commenting on issues of public concern.” SMOLLA,
supra note 230. Courts tend to conclude that speech implicates a public concern so long
as the employee’s speech is not merely about mundane grievances exclusively of interest
to the affected employee. Id. (citing Nichol v. Arin Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d
536, 558 (W.D. Pa. 2003)). Social media communication will almost assuredly include
speech on matters outside of workplace issues.

112

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIX, Issue 2

the “public concern” threshold will be lost in the context of social media591
because courts can less readily decide before trial, as a matter of law, that
claims do not implicate a matter of public concern. Instead, in each case,
courts will need to determine whether the claimant’s adverse employment
action was a result of the employee’s “public concern” speech rather than
other unprotected speech or conduct.592 This inquiry is generally a
question of fact.593 Thus, any judicial efficiency benefit of maintaining the
“public concern” threshold, at least in the social media arena, is likely
illusory.
[194] A broad interpretation of “public concern” in the context of
teachers’ off-campus speech to students using social media would achieve
the same result as eliminating the “public concern” element. Teachers
could argue that even if the expression’s content does not implicate a
matter of public concern, these communications help develop better
teacher-student relationships and thus foster a better on-campus learning
environment. Moreover, since improved public education is a matter of
public concern, this element is established by the context of the message
even if the content fails to implicate a matter of public concern.594
Nevertheless, a more forthright approach would be to dispense with this
requirement altogether.

591

See Melzer, 336 F.3d at 193 (according to the Second Circuit, one purpose of the
“public concern” threshold is its gatekeeping function).
592

See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 681 (1994).

593

See id. at 668-72.

594

Thus far, the only court to encounter this “bootstrap” argument did not explicitly
address it. See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292. In addition, such a broad interpretation
of “public concern” is not easy to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s decision in City of
San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78, 84-85 (2004), a case involving off-duty speech by a
police officer.
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2. The Double-Counting of "Public Concern"
[195] Dispensing with this element would have the additional advantage
of eliminating the redundancy of evaluating this element twice: once as a
distinct threshold element and again within the Pickering balancing test.595
As numerous commentators have noted, this is duplicative.596
3. Garcetti’s Silver Lining?
[196] One benefit of the Garcetti decision is that it allows employers to
regulate public employees’ expressions made pursuant to their official
duties and thereby avoids allowing employees to constitutionalize private
work grievances. Consequently, the need for a “public concern” threshold
is greatly reduced. In short, after Garcetti, the “public concern” element is
less crucial to bar grievance-related claims, particularly if these disputes
are pursued at the workplace.
[197] Garcetti granted school districts, as employers, greater ability to
regulate teachers’ performance of their official duties.597 However, given
the increased control Garcetti allows school districts as employers, the
offset should be that a school district’s ability to regulate a teacher’s offduty off-campus speech is more limited.598 In summary, the silver lining
in Garcetti is that although public employees have fewer speech rights
595

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Seog
Hun Jo, The Legal Standard on the Scope of Teachers’ Free Speech Rights in the School
Setting, 31 J. L. & EDUC. 413, 427 (2002).
596

See, e.g., Ma, supra note 556, at 138-39. Justice Brennan raised this issue in Connick.
See Connick, 461 U.S. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
597

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and thus the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline).
598

Lower courts have not yet interpreted Garcetti in this manner.
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while performing their official duties, they should have greater free speech
rights while off-duty.599 In fact, as this Article proposes, the Pickering
balancing test alone is sufficient to protect the competing concerns
involved in teachers’ off-campus speech to students.
XI. A PROPOSED TEST FOR EVALUATING TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS
SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL MEDIA: SIMPLIFICATION BY
SUBTRACTION
[198] The proposed test seeks both to protect teachers’ speech rights offcampus and to streamline a court’s analysis in this context. With respect
to the two decisions involving teachers’ off-campus speech using social
media to communicate with students, namely Spanierman and Snyder, the
speech in Spanierman would remain unprotected under the proposed test
while the speech in Snyder would be a much closer question, with her
speech probably protected under the First Amendment.600
[199] In order for a teacher’s speech to receive First Amendment
protection under the proposed test,601 the teacher would need to
599

In a more generalized public employee context, the “public concern” element could be
viewed as a limitation on Garcetti—that speech is unprotected only if the employee
speaks pursuant to the employee’s official duties and the speech does not involve a
legitimate “public concern.” But the majority opinion in Garcetti rejected this approach.
A complete discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
600

The court held that Snyder’s claim was barred because her speech did not implicate a
public concern. See Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at
*14-16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). The court made no mention of any adverse impact on
the classroom-learning environment because of Snyder’s speech. Nor did the court
explain whether Snyder’s speech would have sufficiently disrupted workplace harmony
to fail the Pickering balancing test. Because the workplace disruption stemmed largely
from the supervising teacher’s response to mild, indirect criticism, Snyder’s speech
would probably survive the Pickering balancing test.
601

The speech must also foreseeably arrive on campus. In the context of student speech,
school administrators can discipline a student’s off-campus speech if the speech will
foreseeably come to the attention of school administrators. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007). However, given the context of the speech
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demonstrate that her speech was made outside her official job duties rather
than pursuant to her job duties and that it could not reasonably be
perceived as the latter. A teacher’s official job duties would include her
employer’s reasonable performance expectations regarding her teaching
duties.602 These reasonable expectations would likely include most speech
made during working hours or using school equipment when the teacher’s
speech is subsidized or “commissioned” by her employer. If the teacher
meets this burden, the school would then need to establish that its interests
in maintaining an effective learning environment and an efficient
workplace outweighed the teacher’s interests in speaking and her students’
interests in hearing the speech.603 In this context, the school must
demonstrate some level of actual or foreseeable disruption to the
workplace or the learning environment, but the level of disruption will
vary with the nature of the speech. In short, a school must tolerate more
disruption with respect to speech implicating a public concern. With
respect to other teacher-student speech, the school needs to demonstrate a
much lower level of disruption. Furthermore, in evaluating whether the
teacher’s speech disrupts or will disrupt the learning environment,
particularly the classroom learning environment, courts should provide
some deference to school officials’ decisions regarding the ageappropriateness of the speech. In evaluating whether the teacher’s speech
involved in this Article, speech made directly from a teacher to a student, the
foreseeability that this speech will enter the school environment is assumed.
602

Teacher collective bargaining agreements often specify working hours and
responsibilities; many states require unions and school districts to bargain on “wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment.” Teacher’s Unions and Collective
Bargaining: Resolving Conflicts, supra note 446.
603

School officials would also need to establish that the communication would
foreseeably arrive on campus. In the context of this Article’s focus on communications
by teachers to students using social media, school officials would likely face few
challenges in establishing this element. But if a student were to “hack" or gain unlawful
access to a teacher’s social media page, it is unlikely this foreseeability requirement
would be met. The proposed test still requires a court to examine the content of the
teacher’s speech, but current law also requires this step. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol.
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979).
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disrupts or will disrupt workplace relationships between school
employees, courts should not show the same degree of deference to school
officials’ determinations.
[200] This proposed test does not require a teacher to prove that her
speech implicated a public concern. It simply requires the school to
tolerate more disruption for speech involving public matters. This
recognizes the difficulties courts have faced in defining public concern
and the particular challenges courts will confront in defining public
concern in the context of social media. Furthermore, it recognizes that the
school district is regulating speech occurring on the outer fringes of the
employment relationship. Of course, the proposed test does not eliminate
the challenge in defining the contours of “public concern,” but it allows
courts more flexibility to treat this as one factor in weighing the competing
concerns.
[201] Importantly, given the special characteristics of teacher-to-student
communication, particularly the potential confidentiality issues and the
fact that the vast majority of primary and secondary students are minors,
teachers should not receive full First Amendment protection for this
speech. However, this type of teacher speech should be protected if it
passes the Pickering balancing test.
[202] Furthermore, the proposed test simplifies the current test to address
Justice Brennan’s double-counting concerns because the content and
context of the speech is evaluated just once in the Pickering balancing
test.604 In short, the test attempts to achieve a crucial First Amendment
jurisprudential goal of properly balancing the many competing interests.605

604

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

605

See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“The problem in any case is
to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”).
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[203] Finally, the proposed test would make the analysis of off-campus
teacher speech more consistent with the treatment of off-campus student
speech. As previously discussed, most circuits use Tinker to evaluate offcampus student speech.606 Tinker provides that student speech can be
regulated if it causes actual or foreseeable disruption to the school
environment.607 Furthermore, at least in the Third Circuit’s recent
decision, the student off-campus speech was protected even though the
speech was not political speech.608
A. The Teacher Must Establish that Her Speech Was Made
Outside Her Official Job Duties Rather than Pursuant to Her
Job Duties and Could Not Reasonably Be Perceived as Speech
Made Pursuant to Her Official Job Responsibilities
[204] As previously discussed, except in rare circumstances, teachers are
not obligated or even encouraged to communicate with students using
social media beyond the school day or using school equipment.609
Furthermore, the teacher must establish that her off-campus speech using
social media could not reasonably be perceived as speech made pursuant
to her teaching responsibilities. Therefore, if the teacher can establish that
she is neither acting in her official capacity nor perceived to be acting in
her official capacity when she engages in this type of communication, she
meets the first part of the test. With respect to most teacher-student offcampus communications with students using social media, this element
should be met.
606

See supra Part IV.D.2.

607

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).

608

See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2009)
(observing that although Tinker involved political speech, Tinker has not been confined
to just political speech) (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215-17
(3d Cir. 2001)). See also Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007)
(noting, in dictum, that protected speech includes “student expression”).
609

See supra Part VI.A.
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B. The Teacher Need Not Establish that Her Speech
Implicated a Public Concern
[205] Even when the content of teacher speech involves no public
concern, this speech should be entitled to some First Amendment
protection.610 Under the proposed test, a teacher’s speech receives
additional protection if it does involve a “public concern,” but it receives
some protection even if it fails to do so.
[206] Protecting teacher-to-student communication even when the
communication does not involve a “public concern” is consistent with
many educational studies assessing the value of using social media to
enhance students’ educational experience.611 Unfortunately, at present, no
court has fully addressed the policy considerations in regulating teacherto-student communications using social media.
C. School Officials Must Demonstrate That They Can
Regulate the Speech Under the Pickering Balancing Test
[207] Importantly, under this proposed test, teachers’ off-campus speech
rights are not protected to the full extent of the First Amendment. Under
the Pickering calculus, school officials may still limit teachers’ speech in
this context, but only if the school can demonstrate that its interests in
curtailing the speech outweigh both the teacher’s interests in the speech
610

Unless it falls into a traditional First Amendment exception like child pornography,
the speech should be entitled to some protection. See, e.g., N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
764-65 (1982).
611

See Social Networking in Schools: Educators Debate the Merits of Technology in
Classrooms, HUFFINGTON POST, (last updated May 27, 2011, 6:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/27/social-networking-schools_n_840911.html
(concluding that students using social media were practicing useful skills); see also
Educational Benefits of Social Networking Sites, UMNEWS, (July 10, 2008),
http://www1.umn.edu/news/features/2008f/UR_191308_REGION1.html (concluding that
social media offers many benefits in the college learning environment).
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and the audience’s interests in the speech.612 More specifically, courts
should focus on whether the speech caused an actual or foreseeable
disruption to the administrative functioning of the school or its learning
environment and whether this disruption was offset by the teacher’s and
students’ interests in the message.613 In other words, the disruption must
be sufficient to impair or foreseeably impair employer discipline, damage
close working relationships, impede the performance of the speaker’s
duties, or interfere with the regular operation of the enterprise.614
[208] Even when the teacher speech does not directly involve a public
concern, school officials would need to demonstrate some level of
disruption to the school environment in order to regulate the speech.
However, the school officials’ required showing of disruption would be
significantly less when the speech does not implicate a public concern. In
short, the less the speech involves a public concern, the less disruption to
the school environment school officials need to demonstrate to restrict the
speech.615
612

See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1968). The Pickering
“balancing test is less a matter of calculating and comparing absolute values than it is a
process that looks at all the circumstances in a given situation and determines which
interest weighs more heavily.” Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 197 (2d Cir. 2003)
(emphasis in original).
613

See Tinker v. De Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).

614

See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (employer satisfies this test by
demonstrating an actual disruption or a reasonable prediction of disruption); see also
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (the plurality opinion gives substantial
weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption). The government
employer “is more likely to meet its burden when an employee’s disruptive activity
occurs in the workplace than when the equivalent activity occurs on an employee’s own
time, away from work.” Melzer, 336 F.3d at 197 (citing Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S.
138, 152-53 (1983)).
615

In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court has already employed this approach.
In Connick, the Court cautioned that the District Attorneys Office might have to make a
stronger showing of disruption if the employee’s speech more substantially involved
matters of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (the Court’s observation was made
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[209] While not perfect, the Pickering balancing test is a time-tested
approach for resolving these disputes. It best answers Justice Stevens
concerns about First Amendment free speech jurisprudence: “when
constitutionally significant interests clash, resist the demand for a winnertake-all [and] try to make adjustments that serve all of the values at
stake.”616
1. The Teacher’s Interests in Communicating and the
Students’ Interests in Hearing the Speech
[210] The teacher and students’ interests in the speech would, of course,
vary based on the content of the speech. The more political the speech,
the greater the teacher interests in making the speech and the greater the
student interests in hearing the speech.617 As the Pickering Court
observed, “[t]eachers are, as a class, the members of a community most
when weighing the employee’s interests in prohibiting the speech against the employee’s
interests in making the speech).
616

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 434 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
Pickering balancing test requires an analysis of the nature of the employee’s position, the
context of the employee’s speech, and the extent to which it disrupts the organization.
See McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 1998). When considering these factors,
courts should examine whether the speech (1) impairs discipline by superiors, (2) impairs
harmony among co-workers, (3) has a detrimental effect on close relationships, (4)
impedes the performance of the public employee’s duties, (5) interferes with the
operation of the agency, (6) undermines the mission of the organization, (7) is
communicated to the public or to co-workers in private, (8) conflicts with the
responsibilities of the employee within the organization, and (9) makes use of the
authority and public accountability the employee’s role entails. McLaughlin, supra note
440, at 10 (citing McVey, 157 F.3d at 278). The more the employee’s role requires
confidentiality, policy making or public contact, the greater the employer’s interest in
regulating the speech. See id. (quoting Sheppard v. Beerman, 190 F. Supp. 2d 361, 374
(E.D.N.Y. 2002)).
617

See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“‘[S]peech on public issues
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values’” (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 145)).
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likely to have informed and definite opinions” as to education-related
issues and “it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such
questions.”618 It is also important that teachers be allowed to speak, at
least off-campus, on less consequential issues without fear of discipline.
[211] The nature of a teacher’s responsibilities is another consideration
in the Pickering balancing test. The level of protection afforded to an
employee’s activities varies with the amount of authority and public
accountability that the employee’s position entails.619 “A position
requiring confidentiality, policymaking, or public contact lessens the
public employer’s burden in [disciplining] an employee for expression that
offends the employer.”620 A public school teaching position requires a
high degree of trust.621
[212] Depending on the circumstances, the nature of a teacher’s
responsibilities may support allowing or restricting a teacher’s speech.
Public school teachers certainly have student-confidentiality
responsibilities and a degree of public accountability.622 Nevertheless,
although teachers may be required to have some contact with students’
parents or guardians, they are not usually required to interact with the
general public. Furthermore, a typical public school teacher will have
few, if any, policymaking duties. Thus, the nature of a teacher’s
618

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).

619

See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390-91.

620

Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 197 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing McEvoy v. Spencer,
124 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir.1997)).
621

See id. at 198.

622

See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2006) (protecting student records); see also, e.g., Code
of Prof’l Conduct for Teachers, REGS. CONN. STATE AGENCIES § 10-145(d)-400(a) (West
2012). Nothing in this Article is intended to curtail any teacher-confidentiality
requirements under federal or state law. Breaching student-confidentiality will, of
course, tip the balance in favor of the school.
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responsibilities with respect to particular speech will be a fact-specific
inquiry.
2. The School’s Interests in Prohibiting Speech
[213] Under the proposed test, courts would need to weigh the school’s
interests in prohibiting the speech against the teacher’s interests in
speaking and the students’ interests in hearing the speech. The school has
a number of important interests, such as providing an effective learning
environment,623 including protecting students from teacher predatory
conduct, and ensuring an efficient workplace.624
[214] With respect to providing an effective learning environment, courts
should provide some deference to school administrators in weighing the
competing interests.625 In the context of primary and secondary school
teacher speech using social media, the student-audience’s interests in
hearing the information may be limited by age or maturity level.626 Courts
623

Providing an effective learning environment would encompass teachers’
inappropriate, but non-predatory, disclosures to students.
624

See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968) (to determine whether
Pickering’s speech was disruptive, the Court examined whether the speech interfered
with his effectiveness in the classroom or with workplace harmony). The Court found
that the disruption to his employer caused by the letter was minimal: the Court concluded
that Pickering’s speech did not impede his performance of his daily duties in the
classroom nor did it interfere with the regular operations of the school. See id.
Workplace harmony was not disrupted because Pickering’s statements were not directed
at a particular person with whom Pickering would be in contact during the course of his
daily work as a teacher, Pickering’s speech did not involve any issue of discipline by his
superiors, and Pickering’s speech did not impact his relationships with his co-workers.
Id. at 569-70.
625

See Wenkart, supra note 127, at 19-20.

626

See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-86 (1986) (providing some
deference to school officials’ conclusion that a student’s in-school speech was lewd).
Thus, somewhat ironically, the student-audience might have an interest in not hearing the
message.
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should provide some deference to school authorities in these
circumstances because school administrators are best situated to decide
what is appropriate for K-12 students’ maturity levels.627
[215] In addition, protecting students from teacher predatory conduct and
the speech facilitating this conduct is an obviously important school
interest. Within this context, school administrators are best situated to
determine what speech is indicative of predatory conduct. Thus, the
courts should provide some deference to school authorities’ conclusions
regarding predatory conduct.
[216] An effective learning environment extends to all school activities.
Because parental involvement in public education is crucial for its success,
courts should consider, in some circumstances, disruption created by
parents as well.628 Any parental disruption would need to affect the
school’s ability to provide an effective learning environment.
[217] Additionally, with respect to efficient workplace concerns,
workplace harmony is as important in schools as it was in the District
Attorney’s Office in Connick.629 However, courts need not provide any
particular deference to school authorities in these circumstances because
school officials have no particular expertise regarding workplace
employment issues.
627

See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 418 (2007) (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at
683).
628

See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 2003) (reasoning that any
disruption created by parents can be characterized as internal disruption to the school
because the parents threatened to remove their children from the school, impairing the
school’s reputation, and impairing educationally desirable cooperation between parents,
teachers, and administrators). In Melzer, the Second Circuit held that the school could
discipline a high school teacher based on the teacher’s advocacy for legalizing sex
between adult men and boys. See id. at 200. In these circumstances, the court concluded
the discipline did not result from a “heckler’s veto.” Id. at 199.
629

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 165 (1983).
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[218] Finally, the extent of the restriction on teacher speech is relevant in
assessing the school’s interests in prohibiting the speech.630 With respect
to both facial and “as-applied” challenges, a school must demonstrate that
the benefits of a categorical ban outweigh the competing interests.631
Depending on the circumstances, this may be a heavy burden.632
XII. THE PROPOSED TEST BRINGS THE PROTECTION OF TEACHERSTUDENT OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH CLOSER TO THE PROTECTION OF
STUDENT OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH UNDER TINKER
[219] Employing Pickering in this fashion also provides some rough
parity between the treatment of teachers’ off-campus student speech and
students’ off-campus speech. Student off-campus speech is generally
regulated under Tinker,633 which provides that off-campus student speech
630

See Harman v. City of N.Y., 140 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1998) (in the context of
discussing prior restraints, the Second Circuit noted that “concerns that lead courts to
invalidate a statute on its face may be considered as factors in balancing the relevant
interests under Pickering”).
631

See id.; see also supra Part VII(B) for a discussion of these interests.

632

See Harman, 140 F.3d at 118 (concerns underlying a facial challenge are relevant in
balancing the interests under Pickering); see also U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union,
513 U.S. 454, 466-67 (1995) (noting that, in the context of a facial challenge, the
government’s burden was heavy because the honoraria ban was a “wholesale deterrent to
a broad category of expression by a massive number of potential speakers”).
633

Tinker involved student on-campus, political speech. See Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-14 (1969). There is some question as to
whether student off-campus speech must also be political to be protected. See J.S. ex rel.
Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 939 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J.,
concurring). A number of lower courts analyzing off-campus student speech do not
explicitly require nor even discuss whether the student speech was political. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010). In Evans, the district court
applied Tinker to the student’s off-campus speech on her Facebook page. See id. at 1367,
1370. The student established a Facebook page entitled, “Ms. Sarah Phelps [one of the
student’s teachers] is the worst teacher I’ve ever met.” Id. at 1367. The district court
held that the speech was protected speech because school activities were not disrupted
and school administrators could not reasonably forecast that a substantial disruption
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can be regulated if the speech causes “substantial and material disruption”
to the school environment.634 Under Tinker and the lower court cases
interpreting Tinker, there is no public concern requirement.635
Furthermore, the proposed test maintains existing parity regarding the
employers’ burden: Tinker, like Waters, places the burden of justifying the
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion on the school
authorities.636
[220] Although teachers and students are not similarly situated with
respect to their First Amendment rights, it seems incongruent that
students’ speech receives more protection than their teachers’ speech.
XIII. CONCLUSION
[221] Movements to ban teacher-to-student communication using social
media are misguided. These categorical bans are likely facially overbroad
and may be subject to successful “as-applied” challenges as well. A better
would occur. See id. at 1373. The court did not discuss whether the student’s speech was
political. In a typical student off-campus speech case, the dispositive inquiry is whether
the student speech was disruptive. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d
565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011). In Kowalski, the Fourth Circuit applied Tinker’s disruption test
to the student’s off-campus speech, holding that the student’s web page, “Students
Against Sluts Herpes,” which criticized another student, was sufficiently disruptive under
Tinker to be regulated. Id. at 572-73. The Court did not discuss whether the student’s
speech was political. Similarly, most off-campus student threat cases are decided on
disruption grounds rather than political speech grounds. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the student’s claims were properly
dismissed by the district court because, under Tinker, it was reasonably foreseeable that
the student’s off-campus threats would disrupt the school environment).
634

See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14.

635

But see supra note 633 (under a narrow reading of Tinker, a student’s on-campus
speech may need to be political to be protected).
636

See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality
opinion).
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approach to regulating these communications would be to evaluate the
speech under the Pickering balancing test.
[222] As long as a teacher’s communication is not made pursuant to her
official duties or the message’s recipient could not reasonably conclude
the expression was made in a teacher’s official capacity, a school should
be allowed under Pickering to restrict this type of speech only when the
school’s interests in prohibiting the speech outweigh the teacher’s interests
in making the speech and the student’s interests in hearing the speech. In
a departure from current law, this proposed test would not require that the
teacher’s speech implicate a matter of public concern in order to receive
First Amendment protection.
[223] Under the Pickering balancing test, to restrict a teacher’s offcampus speech to a student using social media, a school administrator
would need to demonstrate that the school’s interests in maintaining an
effective learning environment or efficient working environment outweigh
the teacher’s and student’s free speech interests. In balancing these
interests, courts should focus on whether the speech caused an actual or
foreseeable disruption to the administrative functioning of the school or its
learning environment and whether this disruption was offset by the
teacher’s and students’ interests in the message.
[224] The political nature of the speech would be a crucial component in
weighing these concerns: the more political the speech, the greater the
level of disruption that school administrators would need to demonstrate in
order to restrict the speech. However, even speech with no political
import would require some on-campus disruption, whether actual or
foreseeable, to limit this type of teacher-student communication.
[225] This proposed framework attempts to honor the competing policies
underlying free speech jurisprudence: balancing a public teacher’s offcampus rights to free speech with a school district’s interests in providing
an age-appropriate learning environment and efficient working
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environment.637 The framework recognizes that while the government, as
an employer, can at times limit employees’ speech based on workplace
efficiency concerns, the government’s ability to restrict employees’ speech
is far more limited when the government seeks to restrict speech at the
outer fringes of the employment relationship.638 The proposed framework
for regulating teacher-to-student communication using social media also
recognizes the special relationships existing within schools and therefore
does not provide full First Amendment protection to teacher off-campus
speech with students. Instead, it provides extensive protection for teacher
off-campus speech since the framework requires some disruption to the
working or learning environment before a teacher’s speech can be
regulated. Finally, this framework engenders some parity between the
treatment of off-campus teacher speech using social media and off-campus
student speech using social media.639 The Pickering balancing test is a
time-tested approach for resolving these types of free speech disputes and
sufficiently protects the interests of teachers, students, and school
administrators.

637

The Supreme Court has justified First Amendment free speech protection on two
grounds: the rights of the speaker to engage in the speech and the rights of the audience
to hear the speech. The Court “has never endorsed one theory to the exclusion of the
other.” Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 641.
638

See Waters, 511 U.S. at 671 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he government as employer
indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign”). This Article
posits that, at least in most circumstances, school districts will be regulating teachers’ offcampus, social-media speech to students almost in a “sovereign” role, rather than an
employer role, because the restrictions involve speech on the fringes of the employment
relationship.
639

For a general comparison of public employee and student free speech rights, see
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596-600 (6th Cir. 2007). In deciding a student free
speech claim, the Sixth Circuit analogized to public employee cases. See id.
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